Geoff Goddu, “Why I Still Do Not Know What A ‘Real’ Argument Is”

Consider the old saw for syllogisms:

Socrates is a man, and All men are mortal; therefore, Socrates is mortal.

It’s regularly claimed that this is not a real argument, and so is pointless to use as teaching tools.  So what’s a real argument?

C.Hamby’s criteria for real arguments amounts to: matter of judgment, is substantial, is relevant, is controversial, matters, is non-trivial, is prospectively used, is practical.  So the realness of arguments depend on subject-interests.

Goddu’s counter-examples.  With the Socrates syllogism above, imagine someone giving this as a reply to Socrates’ case for the immortality of the soul.  That’s a real argument.

Other cases:  (A1):  some arguments are composed solely of existential generalizations, so some arguments are composed solely of existential generalizations;   (A2) Petunias prance proudly past the pool, so some ‘unreal’ arguments have absurd premises.   (A3) Lemons are red, so the moon is made of blue cheese.  These are all cases where we could, like with the Socrates case, tell a story of how someone could be interested in the arguments.  So they can be ‘real’ arguments.

The class of non-real arguments, then, is, at least by its nature, empty.  Our lack of interest puts things in there – but that’s not about the arguments, but about us.

Moreover, there’s a self-refutation argument.  Here’s how it goes: If you claim that X is not a real argument, that’s a matter of interest to us, so now we have it being a real argument.

Hamby’s reply (which is awesome that the target for criticism was at the session!):  why does the fact that ‘real’ is a matter of indexing to subject interest make the notion of ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ not a useful part of your ontology of arguments?  Surely that’s an important element of pedagogy– we want to teach arguments that make a difference in their lives and our lives.

Q: Doesn’t the self-refuation argument confuse use and mention for argument X?  For the argument to go through, we must use X, but in the form presented, it’s mention-only.

Harvey Siegel, “Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement”

Q1: When epistemic peers disagree, what should the virtuous believer do?

Four possible responses: (i) give up the original belief and take on the other’s view, (ii) split the difference, meet in the middle, (iii) suspend judgment altogether, (iv) stck to our guns.

Q2: Does the depth of the disagreement matter?  E.g., Fogelin’s challenge on deep disagreement.

Siegel’s three theses: #1: The cases for disagreement are varied; #2: Peerhood is misunderstood, and #3: Fogelin’s deep disagreement view is inconsistent with the peer disagreeent view.

RE: peerhood.  Do peers have: same, equal, or equal access to evidence; same or equal intellectual virtues; same, roughly equal epistemic abilities; same, equal, or roughy equal training; same or roughly identical assumptions? Peerhood, if too strict, makes it so that there aren’t enough peers, but if too broad, makes near everyone a peer.

Fogelin’s deep disagreement: all the starting points are different, training different, and so on.  So there’s no room for real argument.  Argument requires that we have enough overlap to argue, but in deep cases, not enough overlap for argument.

The wittgensteinian turn – you don’t have to argue for or be justified in your ‘hinge propositons’.  Because hinge propositions are not intelligibly challengeable.

The evidentialist’s reply: (i) if there’s no argument or evidence for the view, you still must suspend, and (ii) what do you mean that hinge propositions aren’t intelligibly challengeable?  (That’s what a deep disagreement is, dude.)  The wittgensteinian line above is a form of infallibilism.  Yikes!

Siegel’s line: if Fogelin’s right about deep disagreement, then it’s not possible for there to be deep disagreements between peers.  If they are peers, the disagreement can’t be deep; if the disagreement is deep, they aren’t peers.  (This argument is awesome!)

Comment (R. Pinto):  Fallibilism can help with disagreement cases — you can maintain the belief, but look to discussion over time.

Q: Hinge propositions are beyond critical scrutiny, at least practically!

Q: Must deep disagreement have *no* common ground?  If there’s no common ground, it’s hard to see it as a disagreement at all – to recognize a disagreement, you need to have at least some common concepts and commitments.

David Botting, “Interpretive Dilemmas”

In what sense is argument independent of context?  Independent: logical form.  Dependent: identifying the form is a matter of interpretation, which depends on context.  So whether a fallacy has occurred depends on what is attributed to the arguer: (a) the argument form the speaker intends, and (b) the commitment of the speaker to the quality of argumQ: Ient.

This yields interpretive dilemmas.  Interpreters must decide between (i) attributing fallacious argument forms, and (ii) holding that the speaker isn’t arguing or has a contextually appropriate version.  E.g.s:  Tu quoque taken as theoretical (fallacious) or replying to a demand from an inappropriate source, namely, a hypocrite (appropriate).  Argument from pity as theoretical (fallacious) or as practical (appropriate).  Argument from ignorance as demonstrative (fallacious) or as practical attitudes of defaults (relevant)

Comment (The NS’s own John Casey): Here we have a case where we might be looking for good reasoning when there’s not any.  Can’t charity run amok?

Q: Is there instead a trilemma, between fallacy, contextual non-fallacy, and non-argument?

Kathryn J. Norlock, “Receptivity as Argumentative Virtue”

Norman Schwarz in “Philosophy as Blood Sport” tells the story of professor X who attends a session at the APA, acts like a jerk at the session, and leaves announcing, “I do not care how you will reply”.  This is a failure of receptivity.

Receptivity as a virtue of argument matters.  It is a precondition for caring.  Receptivity is a background for intelligent extension of charity rather than indiscriminiate charity.  We care for others’ reasons as others, individuals.  Relationships are central to moral life – are ethics provide an account of where our priorities should lie

Some folks are not deserving of our receptivity.  But most are, and even in adversarial contexts (or in adversarial communities), it’s appropriate to still consider one’s adversary.  Context matters.

We care about ideas, but we care for persons.  Sometimes what we care for takes on a varity.

P.Rooney Comment: Care is triadic in argument exchange.  A-to-B, B-to-A, and both to the value of the epistemic outcome of the exchange.

Q: How is receptivity different from open-mindedness?

Q: How is receptivity different from recognition?

Q: If S is receptive to view A, but A is inconsistent with B, is S not receptive to B?

Q: Can’t receptivity & Charity yield iron men?

Marcin Lewinski, “Polylogical fallacies: Are there any?”

1. Fallacy in argument is either an inferential infelicity or a disruption of intelligent interaction for dispute resolution.  Intelligent interaction is dialogue with pro-con rules.  Fallacies of dialogue are cases of breaking those rules.  Polylogical contexts have more than two speakers, so have different rules.  If different rules, then different kinds of ways to break them.  So polylogical contexts can have different fallacies.

2. Polylogical context is verbal interaction in interaction of multiple parties with distinct positions.  So instead of A-B dialogue, it’s A, B, C,D… polylogue.  Dialogue rules are like rules of court- turn taking.  Polylog rules are more like rules of order for a potentially raucous group.

3. Application: false dilemmas are regularly cases of looking at specific dialogical exchanges, but not acknowledging the variety of the positions on the issue.  Polylogical false dilemma.

Collateral straw man.  A, in responding to C, attributes B’s view to C.  An ‘argument triangle’.

Comment (C.Woods)  Lewinski’s cases may be polylogical cases of fallacies, but the polylogical background may occasion the fallacy, but that’s not the fallacy of the cases.

Q: Must polylogical cases be transitive?  If A beats B, and B beats C, does A beat C?  Answer: NO.

Q: Must there be global or local common ground for polylogical discussion?

Dan Cohen, “Virtue and its Discontents”

Virtue-argumentation theory is out to try to answer three evaluative questions about argument by way of focusing on one.  The three questions are:

What makes an arguer praiseworthy?

What makes an argument praiseworthy?

What makes argumentation praiseworthy?

The virtue theory takes the answer to the first question to be the means to answer the other two. There are two methodological programs for answering any of these questions:

Top down: argue for an ideal, then apply to cases.

Bottom up: gather empirical data about specific cases, gain theoretical insights.

Cohen’s method is a “weird” or “mixed” methodology.  Theorize from “strange cases”: arguing with god, filibusters, academic arguments, impossible arguments, choosing to argue when you shouldn’t, missing arguments, misplaced arguments.   The strategy is to say: here are cases where there are arguments that don’t yield good things, so what is it for arguments to yield something positive?  What is a satisfying argument?  Roughly, the thick concept of a satisfying argument should be in the right place, the right time, to the right people, and on the right topics (and for the right reasons).  That’s a matter of context.  Notice that validity is neither considered either a necessary nor sufficient condition for being a good argument.  Not sufficient: e.g., “a and b  are both P, so a is P” isvalid but not satisfying, and not sufficient: e.g., some arguments are interesting and worthwhile, even if wrongly formed.

So, Cohen poses a sorite: for good arguments, the arguers must argue well.  To argue well, they must be good arguers.  And to be good arguers, they must have stable habits of mind — good arguments do not happen by accident.

Brian MacPherson, “The Incompleteness Problem for the Virtue-Based Theory of Argumentation”

Thesis & Argument:  James Rachels’ ‘incompleteness problem’ for virtue ethics can be inherited by theories of argumentative virtues.  The problem can be solved by a pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument.

The incompleteness problem comes in two forms.  First, there’s no mechanism for conflicts between virtues (e.g.,  open-mindedness vs tenacity).  Second, there’s the question of why be virtuous.  In order to solve either, the V-theorist must go beyond the theory.

If we go beyond the theory, the best option is to go to pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument.  We do better if we know, and virtuous arguers fare better in life both individually and collectively.

Sheldon Wein’s comment: Challenge #1: Does incompleteness of ethical virtues mean in completeness of argumentative virtues?  Challenge #2: The supplement that (a) arguers do better individually and (b) they do better as groups.  The problem is that (a) and (b) also conflict.

Q1: Pragmatic utility can sometimes be in terms of scientific progress, but isn’t this a case for an epistemic theory of argument?  Why not ground them in the sphere of experience of humans knowing?  Why not arbitrate in terms of achieving knowledge.

Q2: If conflicts of virtue are resolved by other means, then what if those other means themselves conflict?

Hey NS readers, John and I will be at this year’s Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) meeting.  We are planning on blogging the papers we attend, with thesis and argument summary and highlights from the Q&A.  We did a run at this last year, and some of the discussions were very interesting.  Here’s the conference website program with a good list of the paper abstracts.  The papers start up in full force Thursday. Additionally, we’ll post our paper for our joint presentation for the NS readership to give some feedback, and we’ll make sure to post the most serious objections.