Kathryn J. Norlock, “Receptivity as Argumentative Virtue”
Norman Schwarz in “Philosophy as Blood Sport” tells the story of professor X who attends a session at the APA, acts like a jerk at the session, and leaves announcing, “I do not care how you will reply”.Â This is a failure of receptivity.
Receptivity as a virtue of argument matters.Â It is a precondition for caring.Â Receptivity is a background for intelligent extension of charity rather than indiscriminiate charity.Â We care for others’ reasons as others, individuals.Â Relationships are central to moral life – are ethics provide an account of where our priorities should lie
Some folks are not deserving of our receptivity.Â But most are, and even in adversarial contexts (or in adversarial communities), it’s appropriate to still consider one’s adversary.Â Context matters.
We care about ideas, but we care for persons.Â Sometimes what we care for takes on a varity.
P.Rooney Comment: Care is triadic in argument exchange.Â A-to-B, B-to-A, and both to the value of the epistemic outcome of the exchange.
Q: How is receptivity different from open-mindedness?
Q: How is receptivity different from recognition?
Q: If S is receptive to view A, but A is inconsistent with B, is S not receptive to B?
Q: Can’t receptivity & Charity yield iron men?