Brian MacPherson, “The Incompleteness Problem for the Virtue-Based Theory of Argumentation”

Thesis & Argument:  James Rachels’ ‘incompleteness problem’ for virtue ethics can be inherited by theories of argumentative virtues.  The problem can be solved by a pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument.

The incompleteness problem comes in two forms.  First, there’s no mechanism for conflicts between virtues (e.g.,  open-mindedness vs tenacity).  Second, there’s the question of why be virtuous.  In order to solve either, the V-theorist must go beyond the theory.

If we go beyond the theory, the best option is to go to pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument.  We do better if we know, and virtuous arguers fare better in life both individually and collectively.

Sheldon Wein’s comment: Challenge #1: Does incompleteness of ethical virtues mean in completeness of argumentative virtues?  Challenge #2: The supplement that (a) arguers do better individually and (b) they do better as groups.  The problem is that (a) and (b) also conflict.

Q1: Pragmatic utility can sometimes be in terms of scientific progress, but isn’t this a case for an epistemic theory of argument?  Why not ground them in the sphere of experience of humans knowing?  Why not arbitrate in terms of achieving knowledge.

Q2: If conflicts of virtue are resolved by other means, then what if those other means themselves conflict?