Can’t go wrong with little theological disputation on a Saturday morning: Michael Gerson offers up the old saw that morality without Theism is vacuous or unjustifiable. Christopher Hitchens replies by arguing that theism is not a necessary condition of morality.
First Gerson.
>So the dilemma is this: How do we choose between good and bad instincts? Theism, for several millennia, has given one answer: We should cultivate the better angels of our nature because the God we love and respect requires it. While many of us fall tragically short, the ideal remains.
>Atheism provides no answer to this dilemma. It cannot reply: “Obey your evolutionary instincts” because those instincts are conflicted. “Respect your brain chemistry” or “follow your mental wiring” don’t seem very compelling either. It would be perfectly rational for someone to respond: “To hell with my wiring and your socialization, I’m going to do whatever I please.” C.S. Lewis put the argument this way: “When all that says ‘it is good’ has been debunked, what says ‘I want’ remains.”
>Some argue that a careful determination of our long-term interests — a fear of bad consequences — will constrain our selfishness. But this is particularly absurd. Some people are very good at the self-centered exploitation of others. Many get away with it their whole lives. By exercising the will to power, they are maximizing one element of their human nature. In a purely material universe, what possible moral basis could exist to condemn them? Atheists can be good people; they just have no objective way to judge the conduct of those who are not.
1. Human beings have good and bad instincts.
2. Morality requires choosing the good instincts over the bad instincts.
3. Moral choice requires an objective standard for judging desires.
4. Atheists have no objective standard for judging desires.
5. Therefore, Atheists cannot be moral.
That’s one construal of the argument. Gerson seems, however, to vacillate between this and something like
\6. Therefore, Atheists have no reason to be moral.
and something like
\7. Therefore, Atheists have no objective moral standards.
Probably part of the problem lies with the slippery notion of what it means to be “moral.” But, setting that aside, 4 is the crucial claim in any version of the argument. And here, I think, Gerson gets a little simplistic.
>In a purely material universe, what possible moral basis could exist to condemn them?
I’m not sure whether Atheists are committed to a “purely material universe.” Seems as though they could hold to the existence of the mental as well. And whether or not they hold that, there are plenty of plausible accounts of morality that ground moral judgment in the nature of reason. If the evolutionary account of ethics explains the origin of reason in evolution need it thereby undermine its authority? If an evolutionary account of mathematical reasoning were developed, would it remove the authority of mathematical proof?
This is, of course, a superficial response, but this argument and the earlier one from Stanley Fish seem to rest on the either deliberate or ignorant disregard of recent moral philosophy. Both blithely dismiss the possibility of a non-theistic justification of morality with several straw man arguments (“purely material universes”) ignoring great bookshelves full of candidate justifications for morality.
It may turn out that there isn’t a coherent non-theistic justification of morality. But to claim that there isn’t, at this point in time, requires some serious response to numerous alternative positions. Until that happens, there seems little reason to me to accept Gerson’s argument. Nonetheless, it would be desirable if the proponents of this argument in the popular press would spend a little more time justifying the controversial premise.
Second, Hitchens. When we strip his characteristic verve from his column we get essentially.
1. Some theists are not moral.
2. Some moral people are not theists.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that theism is a necessary condition of being moral.
As Hitchens points out, Gerson waffles a bit on his conclusion. Sometimes he suggests that theism is necessary for morality, sometimes that it encourages it, sometimes he even seems to grant Hitchen’s argument, but then hold that theism makes sense of the morality that both theists and non-theists can possess.
Damn Colin,
you stole my thunder, I was going to analyze Gerson on my blog!
There’s still a lot more to say about it!
I was just thinking about Richard Joyce’s book The Evolution of Morality. He argues (roughly and from my memory) that a) evolution can provide an adequate explanation of our moral capacities b) the evolutionary account has not (so far) provided a “vindication” of morality c) the evolutionary account “debunks” or gives reason to be sceptical of morality (perhaps it dovetails with a fictionalist account of moral properties).
A more moderate version of Gerson’s argument might ride down the road with Joyce. But, it would still have to acknowledge that there are competing accounts that may not “vindicate” morality by evolutionary theory but are at least consistent with evolutionary theory.
Just some additional thoughts.
This is in reply to your statement –
“And whether or not they hold that, there are plenty of plausible accounts of morality that ground moral judgment in the nature of reason.”
I think that there’s an issue in this statement that is in as much need of nuance as the issue that you touched on regarding the meaning of the phrase “be moral”.
I think it’s possible that a distinction is needed here that isn’t considered when theists (WTM) take this particular line of defense. I’m going to try to sketch out what it seems like needs to be distinguished, but correct me if it doesn’t seem that I’m making my point.
Seems like the problem, ambiguity, comes in the phrase that you use above: “ground moral judgment.”
To me it seems like Gersonites (just sounded cool, I know it’s not an original argument with him) mean to understand “ground moral judgment” in possibly a different manner than you’re supposing when you supply the critical point quoted above. And I’m trying to here think of a way to express the difference in these two supposedly different ways of considering that phrase.
Interpretation 1:
On the one hand, it seems to me like you want to understand it along the following lines, loosely. That is, given certain general aims that a certain species (us) have with respect to much of our actions, certain statements of both reprove and exhortation are reasonably expected to be understood and, ideally, heeded. That is, given that we all basically understand that we’re trying to get this certain thing (let’s say, a ‘pleasant life,’ for instance) accomplished, we should not expect that certain imperatives addressed to maintain that end as a possibility for as many as possible should fall on deaf or non-understanding ears. In this sense, it seems reasonable to suppose that we have have grounds for some (or maybe even ‘any’) particular moral judgment. (e.g. “it is wrong to wantonly slay people).
Interpretation 2:
On the other hand, it think that the Gersonites don’t think of “grounding moral judgment” in this sense. If there’s reason at all to believe that they don’t, then we have to consider that the two groups are talking past each other, and reform the discussion along the lines of the amended ambiguity. So I should give at least a loose (and I realize #1 was not without its problems) take on what the Gerson crew mean by the phrase. I think that that we can understand them not as arguing with their opponents about the fact that – given certain non-controversial aims – some particular moral judgments can be reasonably grounded. Rather, I think that they’re wanting to address what they think is a larger question (perhaps some would urge it’s a non-question, but that’s another claim that requires a defense, and can’t be appealed to nakedly in order to do away with the interpretation in question here). I think the Gersonites are speaking rather of grounding the concept of moral judgment in general. That is, they are wanting to ask the question how any particular moral system (since, as you say, contemporary discussions have supplied us with so many) could be argued for. I think that they think this is an interesting question because they notice (and hope their opponents notice as well) that however a system is argued for, no appeal can be made to value! For, value could not be had in common until both disputants had a moral system in common.
I think that it’s here that their interpretation of the phrase (‘ground moral judgments’) intersects with what seems to be yours. It’s brought into relief, I think, when we recall that your interpretation (correction: my attempt at pinning down your interpretation) makes an appeal to certain common “aims”. That is, it could not get off the ground unless those aims could be appealed to. This is why, I think, you think it fine to say that moral judgments can be grounded “in the nature of reason.” Certainly, by “reason,” you don’t merely mean the mere connecting together of propositions by way of inferential laws. For that is just Logic. And I think that you’d be hard pressed to show how logic, naked, could ground moral claims.
So I’m led to believe that you mean something more by “reason” when you say that moral judgments can be grounded “in the nature of reason.” You possibly mean something along the lines of what any man means when he’s arguing a moral point with a friend or foe and exclaims “C’mon, be reasonable!”. But that doesn’t answer the question that is raised by contrasting the first and second interpretations above. And again, that question is this: To what will you appeal if the disputant in question does not share the aims which you suppose he does.
Suppose that the aim, in particular, that you’re wanting that he share with you is “benefiting society”. Thus, he might ask you why he should be a “good person.” And you might reply that one should be a good person “in order to benefit society.” But if he then asks you why he should wish to benefit society, the one reply that you cannot return to him with is that “it is good to do so.” For that would be circular. It would be like someone asking you why they should play football, and you replying that they should do so in order to score goals.
I think that that particular circularity point (and analogy) is touched on by Lewis somewhere (whom Gerson quotes in his piece), so I’m led to believe that that’s the thinking that Gerson is in accord with. And while I’m not in particular an advocate of everything Lewis says on the matter, I think this is an interesting point.
To conclude,
I think that there is something to noticing that you might mean something different by “ground moral judgment” than these fellows do. Your appeal to “reason” (WTM) seems to suppose that you mean, again, that given certain agreed upon aims we can supply sufficient grounds for moral imperatives. The discrepancy between what you’re advocating and what it seems like Gerson is advocating is that if those aims are not agreed upon (and why should they be, after all?) you – if consistent – do not have the luxury of any sort of appeal to why your aims are “good”… because that is a moral appeal, which you can’t make until after your opponent agree with you about aims. Again, you’d be circular otherwise.
Lewis makes a similar point (almost, seemingly, specifically addressing your appeal to “reason,” when he says:
“…a refusal to sacrifice oneself is no more rational than a consent to do so. And no less rational. Neither choice is rational – or irrational – at all. From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusion can ever be drawn. This will preserve society cannot lead to do this except by the mediation of society ought to be preserved. [And] This will cost your life cannot lead directly to do not do this: it can lead to it only through a felt desire or an acknowledged duty of self-preservation. The innovator is trying to get a conclusion in the imperative mood out of premises in the indicative mood: and though he continues trying to all eternity he cannot succeed, for the thing is impossible.”
I think this speaks to what I outlined as the first interpretation above. If by “reason” you’re implying something “value-loaded” (you know, like batteries included), that’s fine. But that any particular one of those values “should” be the particular ones that both moral disputants share is itself the moral question that I think the Gerson-types are thinking of when they ask how their opponents can “ground moral judgment.” Thus the discrepancy between my two above interpretations.
So is “reason” just this abacus-like calculative device? Or does it actually come with absolute moral imperatives attached at its base. I think the point that the Gersonites are wanting to press is that if – as it seems you’re suggesting in the first interpretation – it comes with these agreed upon aims bearing ‘absolute’ status, this is utterly inexplicable on the anti-theistic conception of reality.
It seems that they would want their opponents to either admit that any of these “aims” that moral reasoning begins with could logically be no better than any other (since ‘better’ itself is a moral appeal), or admit that a theory of reality more robust than matter, energy and motion is going to have to be accepted in order to support the notion of such irrevocable values.
I’ll let Colin defend his own interpretation of his statements. However, I have few comments.
Quote: “I think that they think this is an interesting question because they notice (and hope their opponents notice as well) that however a system is argued for, no appeal can be made to value! For, value could not be had in common until both disputants had a moral system in common.”
So I cannot value a beautiful piece of art and share that value with someone else unless we both share a common moral system? Just as a factual matter, your description of the relationship between value (or valuing) and moral systems is backwards as typically thought by most philosophers working in ethics. Values are thought to ground ethical claims. Conflicting values lead to conflicting ethical claims, thus we arrive at ethical dilemmas. These dilemmas are resolved through a decision process that ends up showing which value is more fundamental or important. Not everyone may give the same priority listing for all values.
Now it could obviously be argued that there must be some ultimate fundamental value in this system; something that would trump all other values no matter the conflict with other values. We can call this the good or perhaps more appropriately the primitive good. I don’t understand how this view would be any different than something like Divine Command Theory (DCT). The primitive good in DCT would be the commands of God. What happens if the commands of God seem to produce a conflict? Then we go to another command to find the resolution (the trumping command). But, DCT is still a value-based normative ethical theory. It claims we should value God’s commands. However, contrary to your claim above, we would seemingly have to share the valuing of God’s commands in order to share the Divine Command moral theory.
I also don’t understand why there has to be only one fundamental value. John Rawls provides a set of three principles that he believes are suppose to provide social justice. Two are primitive and the last provides a way to resolve conflicts that arise between the two primitive principles. I don’t see why there is any necessary reason to believe that there is only one fundamental primitive good. Technically, there could be dozens along with dozens of principles to show how to resolve the conflicts that would inevitably arise.
Now someone could ask: why are John Rawls’ three principles of social justice the primitive good? One could answer simply that the three principles just are the primitive good. This would be very unsatisfactory, but how does the theist do any better? God’s commands just are the good because He says so (commands that His commands are good). That explanation seems just as unsatisfying as the answer that a Rawlsian would give. What I mean by this is that someone who is not a Rawlsian or a Divine Command theorist would not be convinced. So are we stuck at a catch-22 where everyone is seemingly begging the question to everyone else that doesn’t share the same values? Not necessarily.
I believe that a resolution could be reached, but it would require an articulation of the ontological status of values in the world. However, the ontological status of values is a very controversial topic. Some believe that values don’t even exist (even conceptually so this view does not involve social construction). Needless to say that would be bad for any value-based moral theory. Some believe that values are mere social constructions, and thus will at best be intersubjective, but perhaps even just subjective. That wouldn’t bode to well for coming to a solution about how to determine what really is the primitive good. However, a large number of philosophers working in ethics today believe that values supervene on facts. This view, if correct, would give values and valuing a direct connection to the physical world. There are literally dozen of theories that are meant to describe this supervenient relationship. The details of any particular theory are the things that are going to be necessary in order to come up with an argument for why certain values may be more fundamental then others. Without agreement on the details we probably are not going to get very far. But, this does not entail that the supervenience understanding is wrong or that the problems is unsolvable. In the meantime, we can do constructive things like try to determine if the particular moral theories do there job (provide us with a guideline for moral decision making) and if the values underlying them can be made consistent with our other values and/or beliefs.
In using the phrase, “grounded in reason” I was thinking of someone like Kant or Aristotle, both of whom, I take it, provide accounts of morality that anchor it in conceptions of reason and both of whose positions are consistent, I think, in principle with an evolutionary account of how we acquired our rational capacities.
It seems to me that there are three relatively distinct questions that Gerson might tend to confuse.
1. How did human beings acquire the capacities that they have for moral judgment, feeling, and action? The answer is a “story” like [that proposed on the basis of] evolution[ary theory] [edited] or the myth of Prometheus in the Protagoras.
2. How do we explain or justify (ground/account for/analyze) the specific nature of moral judgments, feelings, and action? The answer is a “meta-ethics”–ontology, psychology and epistemology of ethics. (realists, anti-realists, contractualist accounts etc.)
3. How do we justify a particular set of moral judgments, feelings, and actions as the right ones? What principles allow us to decide what is right and wrong? The answer is a normative theory–utilitarianism, deontology etc.
My point is merely that the evolutionary answer to question 1 is consistent with the full range of answers to 2 as far as I can tell from my limited exposure to the area. Gerson seems to believe that the evolutionary answer requires that you are some sort of simple contractarian as an answer to both 2 and 3.
>I think the Gersonites are speaking rather of grounding the concept of moral judgment in general. That is, they are wanting to ask the question how any particular moral system (since, as you say, contemporary discussions have supplied us with so many) could be argued for.
I think you are right about this. But again they underestimate the resources available for answering the meta-ethical question (2) and their seeming independence from the historical question (1). Once again I think of Kant. Roughly, Kant grounds morality in practical reason, and he does it independently (in principle) of theism. Theism enters into the picture when it becomes time to “make sense” of morality, as a “postulate” of practical reason. This latter argument doesn’t seem too convincing to me, though at the same time it seems unnecessary (The argument seems to be that God must exist in order for the discrepancy between the demands of morality and the lack of rewards for moral goodness to be reconciled. God must be there to square the books, in a sense. I don’t see why that is necessary.) Again there seems to be some independence between the way in which we answer questions 1 and 2.
There are moral realists who are physicalists and hold evolution to be true. Assuming that this position is true or at least defensible, then theism is theoretically unnecessary to justify/ground/explain morality. It may still be true, but the argument that Gerson makes against atheism falters without refuting a long list of alternative positions.
Matt, I’m confused about this:
So I cannot value a beautiful piece of art and share that value with someone else unless we both share a common moral system?
I’m not sure about the connection you’re supposing here between art and moral principles. So let’s amend the the example to one that makes more sense, art and aesthetic principles. Then your question would read:
So I cannot value a beautiful piece of art and share that value with someone else unless we both share a common aesthetic principle?
You couldn’t ‘share’ the value with me, no. But actually, this verb ‘share’ is confusing as well, and since we’re talking about moral arguments (analogized here to aesthetic arguments) it would make more sense to stick with something along the lines of ‘convince’ (since the analogy doesn’t change the fact that we’re talking about arguments).
So no, you couldn’t ‘convince’ me of the piece of art’s value unless we shared aesthetic assumptions/principles.
But if we don’t, and you then wish to convince me that your aesthetic assumptions/principles should be adopted, your argument (the argument you make in hopes of my adopting your principles) can make no appeal to the ‘beauty’ which your principles tend to recognize, identify, etc. That appeal would be circular. So what will you appeal to?
But this latter dilemma, analogized back to the moral domain, is what the Gersonites, I think, mean to get at when they ask how you will “ground moral judgment.”
Ought I to adopt your moral system (so that we can then fruitfully and reasonably debate finer moral points)? If so, what is the sense of this ‘ought’ ?
Two senses come immediately to mind:
1) the ‘moral’ ought, but that one’s obviously out.
2) a pragmatic/practical ‘ought’, but this one’s ought as well, since it assumes we should have the same ends, which is like – going back to your art example – assuming we have the same basic principles of aesthetic goodness.
When it comes to why anyone should have those principles, neither (1) and (2) will serve. Both are circular.
Above, under (2), amend to “this one’s **out** as well. ”
Sorry.
Colin–
About this:
“Theism enters into the picture when it becomes time to “make sense” of morality, as a “postulate” of practical reason. This latter argument doesn’t seem too convincing to me, though at the same time it seems unnecessary (The argument seems to be that God must exist in order for the discrepancy between the demands of morality and the lack of rewards for moral goodness to be reconciled. God must be there to square the books, in a sense. I don’t see why that is necessary.)”
I don’t think Kant’s as stringent about stating the objective existence of God as you seem to be stating here (if i’ve misconstrued you claim, I apologize); rather, there’s something more Thomistic about Kant’s postulation of God’s existence, in that it’s an acting “as if,” not so much an acting because of. God doesn’t have to exist, on this account, but we must act as if God exists. However, this existence should only be thought, never stipulated as actual. We must think it, becasue without and object, on the Kantian view, morality is a pointless, elusive venture. I think Kant tries to “sqaure the bookss” in this manner because he wonders about an ultimate good. Without some ultimate good, morality seems to be pointless; morover, without some object embodying that ultimate good, morality seem unattainable. At least that’s how I sense Kant’s arguments, but that’s from a very limited reading of the Second Critique, FWTW.
pardon my tortured syntax. this sentence:
We must think it, becasue without and object, on the Kantian view, morality is a pointless, elusive venture. I think Kant tries to “sqaure the bookss” in this manner because he wonders about an ultimate good.
should read:
We must think it, because without an object, on the Kantian view, morality is a pointless, elusive venture. I think Kant tries to “square the books” in this manner because he wonders about an ultimate good.
Your correction on Kant sounds right to me. I erroneously make it seem a theoretical claim. Though, I’ll admit I’ve never been certain how to think of the “as if” without making it seem like a “noble lie.” But, it’s been a while since I’ve visited the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
i’ve struggled with that, too. while i see why Kant would reason in that way, I don’t understand it and while it is clear Kant would not have us lie to one another, it is unclear whether or not he would have us lie to ourselves. i’ve heard it said that Kant enjoyed playing these little games, toying with the nuances of moral theory. perhaps this whole “act as if” is one of his traicks, but i’d like to think it’s much more serious than that. i think for Kant the difference between the “as if” and the Noble Lie would be a question of the intention behind the act. prima facie, the Noble Lie appears to have some person’s or group’s best interests at heart (i’m going to ignore the sticky paternalism problem there), but that’s really more about the intended consequences, than the intetion of the act, which, in reality, is to deceive. Regardless of the consequences, i think Kant would argue, in being deceived, that person or groups has had some degree of human autonomy taken from them. On the basis of the CI, we know this to be disallowable. The “as if,” on the other hand, the base intention is to act morally. the postualtion, then, of God’s existence, functions really only as a set of utopian goalposts, if you will. it give the act both purpose and precedence. of course thye question still remains whether or not i deceive myself in this act. i’m not sure, at this point, but it’s an intruiging question.
Owen,
You seemingly missed my entire argument about how value is more fundamental then moral (or aesthetic principles). What is causing the confusion is that my question is supposed to be a criticism of your position. Value is value. Moral and aesthetic principles rise out of those values, not the other way around. All of what you say does nothing to show moral systems (or aesthetic) systems come before valuing.
Talking about what “ought” to be the case will not help because I can simply respond that what ought to be the case is what we value the most. And as I said before it will be hard to convince someone of anything unless you share similar values. For example, if we both don’t value rationality, then there is no point in providing arguments. The question then is: what prioritized value set is the correct one, if any? The answer can only come from an understanding of the ontological status of values, but as I mentioned before there is no agreement here as well.
My overall point was to claim that if values do come before principles, then what you claim to be a confusion (or ambiguity) between “the ground of reason” for Colin Anderson and “the ground” of these so-called Gersonites, also seems confused. So what am I “really” saying? That someone (anyone) cannot provide a convincing argument about which meta-ethical theory (or view) is correct without also offering an account of values (provide an axiology) unless they like running in circles (which seems to be one of your worries). I would say that my conclusion is controversial, but I have provided an argument for it in my prior post.
The question then is: what prioritized value set is the correct one, if any?
Seems that Gerson & Co. want to say that on the anti-theistic view, that’s an unintelligible/unanswerable question.
Also they’d want, probably, to point out that the claim that I “should” adopt any “value set” is a moral claim. Thus the circularity again.
But here you say that –
The answer can only come from an understanding of the ontological status of values
Quite, and here Gerson & Co. will probably reply to you that on an anti-theistic metaphysic the “ontological status of values” amounts to a bubbly phantasmagoria of biological events in your brain matter. And then they’ll probably say something like: the notion that one set of biological events can be more true, valuable, morally right (etc.) than another is strange indeed. And then they’ll ask you to explain how such could be so.
Just a few guesses. I don’t want to speak too much for them.