39 thoughts on “Same sex marriage and begging the question”

1. One last argument that I may have treated too lightly. A variation on (b) above appealing to evolutionary function of “marriage” rather than social function runs something like this:

   1. Human beings have been selected for the tendency to form “marriages” for the sake of reproduction.
   2. The evolutionary purpose of “marriage” is the “natural” definition of marriage.
   3. Therefore P/BP

   But, in this case, I think the argument will commit an equivocation when we shift from the “evolutionary” definition of “marriage” (long term mating and shared obligations for exclusive sexual access and shared parenting) and what marriage means socially.

   Surely the advocate of the legal recognition of long-term non-procreative (but perhaps parental) homosexual relationships is not arguing that homosexuals can enter into relationshipsintending  to have children (though this quite likely will be possible in a few years I think, if technology renders this whole argument moot).

   Although I’m not sure about the “naturalistic fallacy” in general, something in this argument bugs me. It seems to me that the evo-bio/psych approach provides an explanation for the fact that we are creatures that typically form these mateships. Thus, it can be used to predict human behavior (typically human beings will partner exclusively for the sake of procreation). As such it seems very powerful: David Buller has some interesting facts he cites–in some societies mateship isn’t considered marriage until procreation; childless couples in 45 societies are half again more likely to divorce as those with a single child; in 160 societies studied, infertility is the second leading cause of divorce; another study infidelity the leading cause. All of this seems to cohere with the predictions of the evo-bio/psych explanation.

   But, does this tell us more than this? Does it entail any consequence for how we ought to codify the legal rights and responsibilites defining marriage? I think not for a number of reasons.

   First, the fact that we have an evolutionary disposition to some practice X, does not entail that we should engage in practice X. (It might explain why we are likely to do so, but not that we should do so.) Nor should an evolutionary disposition to some practice in region R, determine the limits of practice in region R. (I think)

   Take an example, lets imagine that one of the evo-psych accounts of sexual differences in mating behavior holds true–that is, that for some males it is reproductively advantageous to “cheat” (think of the worst case scenario–that doctor 10 years back who was replacing the husbands sperm with his own when doing IVF). Is this a justification of the practice?

   Or another example, we plausibly have an evolutionary disposition to treat “outsiders” worse than “insiders.” This might explain a lot of our behavior, but can it justify it?

   Let’s imagine that there were an evolutionary disposition for men to have mulitple sexual partners outside of the marriage, should they be treated differently than women in the eyes of the law?

   Even if the explanatory claim holds, it isn’t clear what that says for the normative, social, legal, political claim.

   So, it seems to me that at the least, the argument must be supplemented with an argument that shows that the social definition of marriage should cohere or be limited by the evolutionary definition of marriage. Though, I’ll admit, I don’t really understand what the best analysis of this sort of evolutionary argument would be.

2. Colin,
   I had at one time arrived at a very similar conclusion.  I felt that:
   a) A desire to procreate was advantageous to one’s genetic survival.
   b) Marriage as a social / legal institution had helped to foster better child rearing, which in turn created more productive citizens for that society.
   c) Individuals who would form same same-sex marriages put greater value in their sexual satisfaction than their desire to effectively procreate.

   So I concluded that same-sex marriage was not a good stance from a social perspective.  However, I soon met a lesbian couple who had used sperm donated by one woman’s brother to impregnate the other, so they could have a family.  And then I discovered that gay male couples adopt more often than other childless couples (http://www.webmd.com/parenting/news/20080807/men-adopt-twice-as-often-as-women)

   These led me to conclude that because of the relatively modern institution of government sponsored adoption, as well as the much more recent development of artificial insemination, while my argument may have held true in the past, it is not the case today.

   However I may be a bit bias, as I tend to find it very comforting when traditional views hold up under traditional conditions and the more modern perspective seems to be justified by recent developments or discoveries.  It almost makes me think people know what they’re doing.

   Now all we have to worry about is that this new situation will make genetic procreation much easier for women than for men, and we don’t want to go the way of the lady bug.

3. Yes, technology really throws these biological arguments for a loop, since some biological necessities might become mere hindrances. There is also some work being done, I think, that makes it possible for the genetic material of a women’s egg to be transplanted into a sperm cell and used to fertilize the another egg. Not sure how that’s been going. But if I recall correctly, there was some reason why this ought not to be done in the converse way, but I don’t recall the details well enough.  If we develop these technologies the arguments against same sex marriage will, I think, become even more contortionist, than they already must be to rule out adoptive homosexual relationships counting as marriage.

4. These are very good arguments that deserve a detailed response.  I think I can try to put some closure on the matter.

   First, I want to draw the distinction between marriage as an institution in practice and Marriage as an essence and a concept.  I will use capitalization (as I did above) to distinguish them.

   So the question is: IF I claim that “the possibility of procreation” is ESSENTIAL for Marriage, does that mean that it is essential for marriage?  IF SO, it might imply that all couples who wish to marry should be subject to a fertility test, or perhaps even legally obligated to produce offspring.  Let’s call this P1.

   And here’s a corollary of the above proposition.  Since homosexuals can adopt, heterosexuality is NOT a precondition of producing a family.  This means that EVEN IF we deny the proposition above, we must admit that there really are NO biological preconditions for producing a family; ergo, the issue is IRRELEVANT, and there should be NO biological preconditions to marriage.  Let’s call this PC.  (It’s apropos.)

   ALSO, let me propose the following:

   EVEN IF we assume that the family/society function of marriage is PRIMARY and ESSENTIAL to Marriage, and other purposes are SECONDARY, it does not mean that these other purposes are INESSENTIAL or at least CRUCIAL to Marriage.  Something like love or (at least) compatibility–I am unconvinced that this thing called love is not simply a sentimentalization of sexual infatuation that is personalized rather than impersonal–has a natural function in marriage that seems HIGHLY RELEVANT.  Thus love would be a NECESSARY, or at least CRUCIAL, but INSUFFICIENT condition of Marriage.  However, it MIGHT (along with other considerations) be sufficient for marriage.  Let’s call this P2.  (I am aware that I sound like I am splitting hairs to justify a preconceived idea, but bear with me.)

   Let me propose certain arguments that NEGATE P1..

   1.) A certain set of general rules must be applied for marriage so that it is socially workable.  These rules must be consistent with Marriage (there is no point in institutionalizing something that is contrary to the concept) but they need not be completely rigorous or oppressive, and they should offer some “breathing room” for the institution.  The same goes for considerations–such as love–that are CRUCIAL, but not SUFFICIENT.  Thus, a society MAY recognize a marriage that follows the GENERAL RULES of the institution, even if it is not a Marriage in the essential sense, because ALL considerations in the marriage were INSUFFICIENT for Marriage.  A marriage that is not a Marriage is a marriage in form, but not substance.

   If we accept this, we can justify the following:

   1.  In general, men and women can procreate, so heterosexual marriages IN GENERAL are in line with Marriage; therefore, men and women are eligible for marriage IN GENERAL.  A broad acceptance of heterosexual marriage is thus defensible even if there are several cases, such as elderly marriage or infertility, where child rearing is pretty much out of the question.  In the same vein, homosexuals cannot procreate IN GENERAL, so they are not in line with Marriage; therefore, homosexuals are not eligible for marriage.  (For the moment, we are ignoring PC.)  Since society operates by these general rules, it need not institute outlandish measures such as fertility tests, legal childbearing obligations, and lie detector tests to determine if the couple’s “love is real”.  However, we do have incentives for childbearing (dependent deductions), stigmas for “golddiggers” and measures such as prenumptual agreements to ADDRESS these issues.  Let’s call this the doctrine of PROPORTIONALITY.  A society regulates the institution of marriage in accordance with its NECESSARY and otherwise CRUCIAL considerations, but does so in a general way that is proportionate to and reflective of THAT SOCIETY’S VALUES and PRIORITIES.

   Note that these things tend to take care of themselves.  When a society emphasizes companionship to a certain degree, its members conceive of things like elderly marriage, and the society in turn recognizes it.  If a society thinks in terms of family generation, its members generally do not entertain the notion of elderly marriage, and it goes not only unrecognized, but unheard of.  The same thing goes with homosexual marriage.  If a society greatly emphasizes love and companionship and de-emphasizes the family element, and if a society is infatuated with the idea of inclusiveness über alles, it might accept homosexual marriage.  Of course, the 300 pound gorilla here is that there are other EXOGANOUS considerations with homosexuality that lead to a double standard.  If we are arguing against homosexual marriage IN GENERAL and NOT simply based on this line of reasoning, we may consider these things.

   Now to address PC.  Yes, with adoption, there are no biological restrictions to family.  But then again, there is no connection between homosexuals getting married and homosexuals adopting, since the marriage has nothing to do with the formation of the child.  The only possible consideration is that two Dads are better than one.  But then why not three Dads?  The point of monogamous and perpetually binding marriage is so that the children are united with their biological parents and vice-versa.  This has nothing to do with homosexuals.  Thus, you could PLAUSIBLY argue that the issue of adoption is not relevant.  Once you introduce factors that independently discourage the seemingly bizarre family situation of two fathers and the different contributions of the mother and the father, the argument could strengthen.  (I won’t introduce these exogenous arguments here; I’ll keep it in the realm of a theoretical possibility.)

   Thus, I would conclude that depending on the values of a given society, it may allow or prohibit homosexual marriage without explicit contradiction, since marriage is as much a matter of form as substance.  However, homosexual Marriage IS a contradiction; and it is up to the society how closely it wishes to tie marriage with Marriage–form with substance–although there is probably a line it should not cross, such as fertility tests and legal childbearing requirements.  Both positions are defensible IF one is only considering the issue on an existential level.  This DOES NOT MEAN that Marriage, or even marriage, is a construct that is infinitely malliable.  The near-universal prevalence of marriage in the evolutionary and temporal senses, combined with the logic of procreation and the superiority of monogamous marriage in promoting enduring, healthy, and prosperous societies, gives credence to the argument that there is indeed an essence of Marriage, and that there are thus logical limits to marriage.  For example, “interspecies marriage”, being married to someone who you never met, etc. are outside the boundaries of credulity.  Homosexual marriage is not (unless you introduce an argument that addresses the legitimacy of homosexuality in itself) but neither is exclusively heterosexual marriage.

   But that’s just my position.  I could imagine someone saying that the argument from GENERAL INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE is not strong enough to counter the basic injustice of excluding homosexuals from the institution.  I would respond that I do think that there are other things to consider regarding homosexuality per se that outweigh inclusiveness; and that even if the first argument is not airtight, the other person’s is not airtight either.  The argument is DEFENSIBLE, even if not completely compelling, and that I find the argument MORE compelling than the principle of inclusivity.  I am more concerned with Marriage than inclusiveness, and I see Marriage in its most basic form is losing ground to a conception of Marriage that is decoupled from family, a decoupling which I believe can only result in the extinction of marriage (though NOT of the more or less eternal concept of Marriage).  I am thus not disposed to allow society to further emphasize love and sex and de-emphasize family.  Thus, when I say I want to protect marriage, I am really saying that I want to protect Marriage by meshing marriage more to its essence.

5. Pauly D,

   No one concedes this:

   First, I want to draw the distinction between marriage as an institution in practice and Marriage as an essence and a concept.  I will use capitalization (as I did above) to distinguish them.

   The idea that there is some essence or concept marriage over and above the practice, the institution, or whatever of marriage is dubious in extremis.  I think this has been made abundantly clear many many times.  But, indeed, if you assume again that this has some kind of meaning, which no one obviously will grant you, then indeed, all of your conclusions follows ever so nicely.  To reason like you have here and throughout this discussion is to reason in a huge circle.

6. John, I would concede that there is something biological let’s call it “pair-mating” and define it in terms of the tendency human beings have to form long term sexual partnerships for the purposes of procreation and child-rearing. This is seems to me is distinct from the cultural practice we call “marriage.” And it probably is able to be explained by evolution–our typical forms sexual and procreative activity are different than other primates for example, and presumably at some point disposition to  “pair-mate” were selected for.

   But if I follow your argument Pauly, you seem to have defended the claim that homosexuals can not “pair-mate” becaause currently they can not “mate.” I agree with this claim.

   This isn’t, I believe, what is at stake in the debate surrounding same-sex marriage (small m) and that is a matter that can’t be determined by appeal to the “essence” or to “biological facts.”

   However, I do not follow the consequences of your commitment to Marriage for your position on marriage. That’s the step that I think is now problematic for me. But it’s too late for me to think that step through right now.

   Nevertheless, I think these long posts and comments have produced greater clarity and rigor in this conversation.

7. Mr. Casey

   It is YOUR contention that Marriage is an infinitely malleable institution that basically means whatever we (technically, you) want it to mean that is “dubious in the extremis”.  If I practiced your extreme nominalism, my argument would be MUCH easier.

   Marriage: def.  The union between a man and a woman whose general purpose is to form the nucleus of the family.

   End of story.

   There is a natural connection between the practice of marriage and its main purpose, as conceived by every society that’s ever practiced it.  If you divorce marriage from childrearing, you wind up with a form of mimicry that will expire when everybody realizes that it is pointless.  It is this connection between marriage and the point of marriage,  amongst other things, that gives it its essence.  There are social institutions that are based entirely on sex.  They are called brothels.  Remove sex from brothels and you lose the point of the brothel.  It works the same with marriage and family.

   Ultimately, I believe in a practice of marriage that is ideal (or a range of practices that are ideal) and a practice that is sub-optimal (gold-digging, Indian sati).  You believe this too.  I believe that it is based on the nature of marriage and of the Good in general.  You believe that marriage (as well as everything else, if I’m guessing correctly) revolves around inclusiveness and non-discrimination and that all things must give way to your insistence in totalistic inclusiveness; (everybody must be included in everything).  This is another subject for another time.  Suffice to say here that this extreme inclusionist philosophy can be demostrated to be just as arbitrary and ultimately groundless as anything you care to name.

8. Colin.  Yes, I would put that under the “practices” or at least the “whatever” in the above remark.   Anyway, I think our biological evidence on “pair-mating” is probably rather thin beyond recent history (this is not to say it isn’t true–it just isn’t essential in the no round squares sense).  But, I might remark that homosexuals can and do mate, just not with each other.

   Nonetheless, to repeat, I fail to see how defining “Marriage with a big and bold M” as the essential, core definition, and then claiming that little m marriage must be consistent with it does anything other than beg the question with a capital BTQ. 

9. John,

   I agree with the second point you raise–that there is no good reason for marriage to conform to Marriage. Part of the evolutionary-psychological account of marriage is that we also have biological adapatations that prompt infidelity as part of our mating strategies. That is, there is every bit as much reason for the government to sanction infidelity because our biological practice dispose us to Infidelity as part of our pair-mating strategies. (Maybe a tax break for each affair you have without getting caught?).

   I’m still not clear on how these evo-psych arguments work, but off the cuff it seems to me that there is little reason to believe that because we have evolved a certain disposition to a practice because it provided for reproductive success that we today should give a fig for conforming to that practice. I’d like to say that you can’t derive this ought for this is, but I’m wary of making that the explanation for why the inference fails. Nonetheless, I think it is pretty weak and the appeal to “pair-mating” adds little (perhaps nothing) to the argument against same-sex marraige as a legal and social practice.

   And I think that the evo-bio stuff on pair-mating is pretty robust–that is, the argument that “pair-mating” is an adaptation–that we have evolved disposition to enter into reproductive “alliances” in which males trade mating opportunities for co-parenting seems to provide a reasonable explanation for why humans have tended to be monogamous and form exclusive reproductive elationships. Certainly there are exceptions, and it seems that we can override these dispositions–but as part of an explanation for why humans have the sorts of emotional and cognitive makeup that we do it, or something like this account, seems to be pretty plausible.

10. Pauly,
    The crucial steps are here I think:

    “1.) A certain set of general rules must be applied for marriage so that it is socially workable.  These rules must be consistent with Marriage (there is no point in institutionalizing something that is contrary to the concept) but they need not be completely rigorous or oppressive, and they should offer some “breathing room” for the institution.”

    I’m not sure about this claim that “marriage” must be consistent with “Marriage”–do you mean, that whatever sort of social rules that we have constructing “marriage” they should cover Marriage (in my language, “pair-mating”)? And what does “cover” mean here? Promote? Endorse? Not contradict the possibility of? If the last, then the claim seems plausible (the others would need further argument in terms of social function I think), though I don’t think consistency in this sense is going to generate the conclusion. All it’s going to do is argue that:
    mCM: marriage should not contradict the possibility/desirability of Marriage.

    An example might help: If we created a Republic like system that raised all children communally, I think that that would conflict with our evolved dispositions to care for the children we have either adopted or created.

    But, this sort of thin consistency isn’t going to rule out other possibilities, such as, marriage institutions that do not involve shared-parenting, or exclusivity, or consistent reproductive opportunities between partners, or group marriages, or non-procreative relationships, or same-sex unions.

    I think that you trade on a much more robust notion of consistency–something like “homology” or even substantial identity when you conclude:

    mIM: A marriage that is not a Marriage is a marriage in form, but not substance.

    Though I think this also needs to be changed slightly: ,

    mIM: A marriage that is not a Marriage (pair-mating) may have the form of a Marriage (pair-mating) but not its substance.

    I think you are right with the conclusion, however, that it is a society’s values that determine the form and extent of application of marriage rules (not therefore Biology), and, therefore (I add), only thin consistency is required here.

    Thus, we look at values like non-arbitrariness in the distribution of opportunities, rights and responsibilities and conclude that marriage should at least include some homosexual relationships (unless it wants to exclude many heterosexual relationships).

    I can’t exactly fathom what it means to be concerned with “Marriage” (“pair-mating”) as a Biological “institution.” It will, it seems to me, take care of itself. If we start to worry about birth rate etc., then we address that problem with practices and institutions that are consistent with our social values. Nor do I see why we would sacrifice core social-moral values such as justice in order to make sure that “pair-mating” is protected from seemingly imaginary threats.

    So we agree it seems to me that the question of same-sex marriage is not ultimately a biological question, but a question about moral, social, and political values. That is, a question about what is right and what is wrong, not how we evolved in the past.

    I’m not sure what sort of value will now underwrite the exclusion of same-sex marriage, once we jettison the attempt to ground the exclusion in evolutionary biology. I think the important step has been crossed here, and your ultimate conclusion I find thoroughly unpersuasive except as biographical or perhaps anthropological interest.

    “I am more concerned with Marriage than inclusiveness, and I see Marriage in its most basic form is losing ground to a conception of Marriage that is decoupled from family, a decoupling which I believe can only result in the extinction of marriage (though NOT of the more or less eternal concept of Marriage).  I am thus not disposed to allow society to further emphasize love and sex and de-emphasize family.  Thus, when I say I want to protect marriage, I am really saying that I want to protect Marriage by meshing marriage more to its essence.”

    Now the argument seems best construed as a version of (b) in my post above–a sort of argument from negative consequences:

    1. Homosexual marriage will contribute to the undermining of “pair-mating.”
    2. “Pair-mating should not be undermined”
    3. Therefore, we should not allow homosexual marriage.

    I find the first premise of this argument wildly implausible: I see no plausible causal account that would legitimate 1. It may be a coherent argument but it is an incredibly weak one.

11. And try substituting “opportunistic adulterers” which according to evolutionary psychologists and biologists is as much a part of our natural mating practices geared at maximizing reproductive success, as co-parenting, and expectation of sexual exclusivity, into the arguments above. Again if the biology is doing some sort of independent work here (in your argument), fostering/promoting opportunistic adultery should, it would seem be part of marriage or else it will not be Marriage in form or substance).

    An independent social argument is presumably needed to justify condemnation of adultery etc.

12. Pauly,

    Your strategy for this whole discussion has been (1) to assert a definition of marriage as THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE all in BOLD and (2) to derive on that basis conclusions about what counts and what does not. 

    The problem is, however, there is no reason to believe your definition of marriage obtains in the way you think it obtains.  While there may be biological practices which involve coupling between two people for a time, there are lots of other alternatives to that arrangement.   This, notice, is a different question from the one about whether the coupling of two people in a family situation is the ideal social arrangement, when ideal means, oh, I don’t know, conducive to worldwide domination of the culture to which the married couple belongs (or some such thing). 

    Since the initial definition, concept, or essence is the foundation of your argument and all subsequent conclusions derived from it, and since that definition has fairly and reasonably been called into question, you beg the question when you simply assert it.  As you do here:

    Marriage: def.  The union between a man and a woman whose general purpose is to form the nucleus of the family.

    End of story.

    No that is not the end of the story.  Whether that is the definition of marriage or how you derive that or where it exists or for how long and and forth is the beginning of the story.

    And one more thing.  Instead of failing to grasp the simple fact that you have to offer evidence for what you say, you seem more interested in thinking up what my view might be and then attacking it:

    It is YOUR contention that Marriage is an infinitely malleable institution that basically means whatever we (technically, you) want it to mean that is “dubious in the extremis”.  If I practiced your extreme nominalism, my argument would be MUCH easier.

    And:

    You believe that marriage (as well as everything else, if I’m guessing correctly) revolves around inclusiveness and non-discrimination and that all things must give way to your insistence in totalistic inclusiveness; (everybody must be included in everything).  This is another subject for another time.  Suffice to say here that this extreme inclusionist philosophy can be demostrated to be just as arbitrary and ultimately groundless as anything you care to name.

    These aren’t my views.   And I’m not sure on what basis you think they are.  Perhaps you think I must hold the opposite of your extreme realism, so I must be an extreme nominalist.  Well, that would be yet another reasoning error.  What my view is beside the point anyway.  You’re the one asserting definitions of marriage as somehow obvious when they’re obviously not obvious.

13. I concede that homosexual marriage is similar enough IN FORM to Marriage as to be defensible.  (This is self-evident actually; since so many people can in fact conceive it, there would have to be formal similarities of some sort, unlike marrying a toaster.)

    So let me just demonstrate why I say that the family-model is THE essential component of Marriage, even while CONCEDING that other components, while inessential, are crucial. 

    1.) The entire structure of the institution–its rules and practices–is designed around the basic idea of organizing a society around family units and preserving these units.  Almost all of the practices of marriage can be traced to the concerns of family formation.

    2.)  Family-formation is the only truly ESSENTIAL link to the practices of Marriage.  You can have love, commitment, financial and living arrangements etc. without the farrago of Marriage; and likewise, you can have Marriage without the farrago of love, commitment, etc.  It would not be an ideal thing, but it has been done.  It is ONLY when you introduce family-formation into the equation that the the Whole Deal of Marriage becomes crucial.) 

    3.) The provision of a family model is the most important feature of Marriage.  Again, life without marital love and companionship might not be the best, and arranged marriages might not be anyone’s cup of tea, but if the family model breaks down, and you get either rampant illegitimacy, polygamy, Plato-Clintonism (the communal child-rearing thing), or non-reproduction, Hell breaks loose.

    4.) Marriage has been practiced very differently throughout the ages, so how is it that we can and do recognize all as marriage?  There seems to be a unifying essence at work here.  The only question is, what is it?

    Let’s use an example that illustrates these points.  Let’s say Brenda and Eddie are going steady in the summer of ’75.  When they decide that the marriage will be at the end of July, most think that this is a pretty huge step.  But why?  Going Steady involves monogamy and companionship and devotion, just like marriage; so marriage would not seem to be that significant.

    But what if Brenda and Eddie decided to have a child?  Now, we see a huge difference (or at least, those of us who believe in Marriage do) between Marriage and Going Steady.  Brenda and Eddie, with child will have to commit to each other so the child has a stable family.  They cannot call it off lightly if they decide it’s not working (unless it’s abusive).  They will have to think about economics and providing for the child.  Going Steady entails none of this, but Marriage does.  Furthermore, let’s say Brenda and Eddie do NOT get formally married, but they commit to living together, providing a home and a stable family life for the child, and providing for the child’s economic needs.  But even if they are not FORMALLY married, what is this if not Marriage?

    We see how Marriage is inextricably linked to family in a way it is not linked to anything else.  Even if Brenda and Eddie do not get married, they DO get Married.  They apply the function and spirit of the institution.

    Example #2:  Brenda and Eddie get married, have no children, grow old with each other, and die happily.  This is formally a marriage, and it comes CLOSE to a Marriage, in that many legitimate components are there.  However, upon reflection, we find that Brenda and Eddie could have gotten by without taking too much care of material needs.  The issue of religion was of no consequence because there was no need to decide how to raise the child.  Even monogamy and fidelity would not be that big a deal.  Eddie could have had three other wives so long as he did not need to support them or their children.  Brenda might not have liked it, but this is a matter of personal and social expectation, not social health.  In short, the marriage is FORMALLY real, because marriage is a social institution and the couple remained within the social parameters.  The Marriage, however, is superfluous.  The actual spirit of the institution does not really come into play.  Furthermore, there is no social need for Brenda and Eddie to get married, as society has little interest in either party being all that spiritually fulfilled.

    So while Brenda and Eddie DO get married, the do not get Married.

    This is not to seem callous or presumptuous.  Look at Abraham.  He considered his marriage unfulfilled despite growing old with his wife, and being presumably devoted to her.  When the marriage proved barren, the rules of the institution were bent (he “went into” his maid) so that the spirit of it could be preserved.  (This is not to say that the old Abrahamic marriage was the best or the neglect to mention how Hagar felt about the bargain or that it might just have been Abraham’s fault are not somewhat objectionable; this is just to show how central the family has always been.  And note that the Old Testament DOES give Hagar and active role, which is interesting coming from a time where one would have expected a female maid to have been considered a piece of property.)

    Example #3.) King George marries Queen Mary to acquire the south of France (my medieval history is shaky).  This would be an example of making the financial consideration of marriage primary instead of subservient to the ultimate purpose.  However, the fact remains that Mary and George are a royal family who will be expected and presumably desire children (even if only as heirs).  The purpose of the institution is untouched.  The child still has a father and mother and is provided for; and all the other considerations (monogamy, fidelity) still serve their purpose to the extent that they are followed.  Love was not an issue, but that just supports my argument.  The spirit of Marriage was preserved and its function fulfilled, and love had nothing to do with it, ergo love is inessential to Marriage.  This is a Marriage, though not an ideal Marriage.

    Example #4.)  Let’s say Paul and Heather are engaged to be married.  Heather has Paul’s child, but then divorces him for child support and alimony.  (Yes, I realize that this is not the way it really happened between McCartney and Mills.)  These folks went through the formalities of marriage, but this cannot be called Marriage in any real sense.  It is closer to prostitution (worse, considering the way the child was used as a prop).  It is a travesty of Marriage, though the legality is in place.  (However, in a society that takes marriage seriously, I can imagine this marriage being annulled.)  An excellent example of how marriage and Marriage are distinct.

    Example #5) Homosexual marriage with adoption.  The marriage had nothing to do with the children, (he might have well been a single child-seeker).  Furthermore, the whole point of having one man and one woman in marriage (I’m not even talking about monogamy, I’m talking about the basic man-woman union) is that this, quite frankly, is where babies come from.  Male-on-male unions have nothing to do with producing children, so we’ve not yet begun when marriage has been cut off from its function.

    I find adoption arguments unconvincing generally.  Adoption is a measure that is taken when the family model breaks down because of abuse or infertility.  It presumes the family model in the first place and also presumes biological families to be the norm; otherwise, adoption would be a market for children instead of a child-welfare resource, and if children come in the open market, Marriage again is extinguished.  “Family” and “biological family” are thus sufficiently synomomous that adoption is a particularly uncompelling reason to expand the boudary of marriages to homosexuals.  So, while there are enough formal similarities with Marriage to recognize this societally as a marriage; the fact remains that it is NOT a Marriage.

    Also, I would also suggest, exogenously, that mothers and fathers have seperate functions and it is better that the child have one of each.  Thus, the Two-Dads model is not in sync with the family model and I would conceive it.  (Thus if the society agrees with me on this, it is yet another reason to not recognize homosexual marriage.)  If the issue would ever come to it, I would also cite several other exogenous variables about homosexuality that impell me to discourage their marriage.

    Example #6)  Homosexual Marriage w/o adoption is obviously a non-Marriage.  Family is not and could not possibly be an issue.  Again, since marriage is a social institution with socially defined parameters, it is feasable to have homosexual marriage.  But if the social institution forgets its essence/purpose, it becomes a form of mimicry that only holds a linguistic connection to the thing itself, in the way diffident (meaning “distrusting) only holds a linguistic connection to diffident (meaning “meek”).  Modern Americans increasingly do not think of family when they think of marriage, and it results in high divorce rates, high adultery rates etc.  These high divorce and adultery rates are signs that the institution is weakening as it forgets its purpose.  And why would it not weaken?  It’s like example #2, where Brenda and Eddie have no real reason to follow the rules if they don’t understand the point of the game.  Brenda and Eddie follow the rules only because it is socially expected.  It is a social habit.  But habits devoid of purpose do not last. 

    My Conclusion:  Even though homosexual marriage is feasible, because it has formal similarities to Marriage, it is not connected to Marriage, and someone who wishes to reinforce the connection between the two would be against it just on those grounds.  Someone who is critical of homosexuality itself would have additonal reasons to oppose its normalization–i.e. it’s being recognized as being a neutral alternative to heterosexuality.

    BUT, if you do not have a problem with homosexuality itself, and you either don’t think homosexuality will have an effect on the conception of marriage OR you have no interest in preserving Marriage at all, and would be fine with communal child-rearing or polygamy, or illegitimacy, or social/demographic extinction, go ahead and endorse homosexual marriage and vive le diference!!

14. The independent reasons against opportunistic adultery are

    A-Marriage involves a vow, and people should keep vows.

    B-Opportunistic adultery leaves open the possibility of cuckolding.

    C-Monogamous relationships involve trust that is broken by adultery.  We do not want jealousy poisoning the family.

    All of these things are not independent.  Marriage prohibits adultery (generally) for precisely these reasons.  This reinforces my point.

15. “BUT, if you do not have a problem with homosexuality itself, and you either don’t think homosexuality will have an effect on the conception of marriage OR you have no interest in preserving Marriage at all, and would be fine with communal child-rearing or polygamy, or illegitimacy, or social/demographic extinction, go ahead and endorse homosexual marriage and vive le diference!!”

    Yes, so if it is the case that
    a) homosexual marriage does not undermine marriage and
    b) one does not have a “problem” with homosexuality,

    then there is no good reason to be opposed to same-sex marriage. The first claim seems to have been provided no reasonable justification and the second–well, that’s what the point has been all along. The reason that people offer these arguments against same-sex marriage is because they have a “problem” with homosexuality and all of evolutionary biology and handwaving about tradition is just an attempt to not say that straight up. Perhaps, some will offer some claims about the needs of role models of both genders, but I don’t get the sense that there is any really good research or evidence to justify this claim. You’ve made the issue transparent it seems to me.

    I don’t see that the series of examples does anything to add to the argument. The core points are conceded in the quotation above, I believe.

16. Mr. Casey,

    I have repeatedly justified my understanding of the essence of Marriage.  I have done so again, at great length, two posts ago.  If you read this post and still think that I am not even attempting to ground my contention that marriage has an essence and describe that essence, I then don’t know what to tell you.  If I cook you a steak and serve it to you, you are free to say it’s a bad steak, but not to say that it isn’t a steak.

    I use CAPS to emphasize crucial terms. 

    And what you say really sounds like extreme nominalism to me.  I may be heavy on the essentialism, and so might be more apt to smell nominalism when it’s not really there, but then again, you did say that “the idea that there is some essence or concept marriage over and above the practice, the institution, or whatever of marriage is dubious in extremis”.  Let me ask you then:

    Is there any essence of marriage that provides a common thread between these various practices?

    If not, how do you avoid the nominalist pitfall that marriage is just whatever anyone says it is?

    If so, then what IS this thread?  That is, what is marriage, in your understanding?

    And yes, homosexuals can and do mate, just not with each other.  Homosexuals can legally marry heterosexually also.  Might not be a good idea, but it is legally recognized.

17. As far as I’m concerned, the strongest arguments in favor of marriage appeal to the well-being of a community – as in, “marriage (between a male and a female) as an institution leads to the greatest well-being of a community” or some such claim. But these sorts of arguments are merely predictive, meaning that they rely on empirical evidence for their support. Even if it turns out that marriage is essentially between a man and a woman, that would not imply the more important claim that such an arrangement would lead to the well-being of the community. It may not. If it turns out to not be the case that marriage as defined leads to the well-being of the community, then we should either get rid of our concept of marriage as it stands (even if it has been decided that the essence of the concept is such and so), or give way to the new concept “marriage*” which is such that it leads to the well-being of the community.

    This of course must rely on a proper factual/normative framework for assessing well-being, or defining the morally relevant features of a community (I’m fond of Nussbaum’s “capacities” approach she proposed to the UN some years ago). In any case, it seems that denying people rights because of a dogmatic (and maybe essentially true) definition of a social practice is not conducive to the well-being of a community.

18. Well, the three things I said were

    1. Marriage is essentially linked to children

    2. It is thus defensible but not strictly imperative on existential grounds not to recognize homosexual marriage.

    My argument was IF 1 then 2 (with a lot of steps in between).

    So yes.

    I would however like to clarify that I see no reason why it is imperative to recognize homosexual marriages on existential grounds unless you have other values that make such imperatives operational.  (I don’t.)

    Otherwise, there’s not much to say.

19. I don’t know what you mean by “existential grounds” here.

    The argument for recognizing same-sex marriages is non-arbitrary exclusion of people from privileges and rights. Since we recognize non-Marriages as marriages for heterosexuals, we are morally obligated to recognize non-Marriages as marriages for homosexuals, unless there is some non-arbitrary reason to differentiate.

    It seems to me that all of the attempts to show that there is some non-arbitrary, non-question-begging, secular reason to exclude homosexual marriages have failed.

    The handwaving about marriage/Marriage does not succeed, neither do the slippery slopes, or appeals to tradition, or any of the other apocalyptic suggestions about the need of what I would call biological dispositions towards pair-mating to be protected from homosexuals and Europeans.

    When we boil it down we have, as you say, “one should believe that homosexuals should not be allowed to marry, if one has a “problem” with homosexuals,” which I think is not even begging the question, since it is such an awful argument.

20. The Existential argument, obviously refers to everything derived from the definition of marriage, or how it is understood. Obviously, the existentialist argument amounts to: if the concept of marriage intrinsically does not allow for homosexual “marriage” (round square), there can be no such thing.

    Since we recognize non-Marriages as marriages for heterosexuals, we are morally obligated to recognize non-Marriages as marriages for homosexuals, unless there is some non-arbitrary reason to differentiate.

    You really should refrain from adopting arrogant attitudes when committing fallacies.

    “Since we recognize non-Marriages as marriages for heterosexuals, we should do so for marriages between a man and his pet.  If one man wishes to “marry” his pet, society can’t say that he can’t because that would be discriminatory and arbitrary.  If one objects that the pet isn’t a willing participant, I will say, look, in many marriages of old neither party was a willing participant.  Furthermore, a family can still force someone to marry into a loveless marriage against their will by applying social and economic pressures.  Therefore, it would be arbitrary to exclude this Man-Bear-Pig marriage.  That is to say, because we allow some forms of pointless marriage, we are morally obligated to allow all of them.” 

    What?  This doesn’t follow?  I’m sorry; but it does.  The understanding of Marriage is the only thing preventing someone from claiming he can marry his toaster; just as the understanding of Brothel, is the only thing preventing someone from applying that term to a chocolate factory.  A concept carries inherent limitations.  The question is what limitations.

    In reality, once you concede that there is such a thing as Marriage, and that homosexual “marriage” was a non-Marriage marriage, you also implicitly concede that a society has every right not to recognize it, because it is a non-Marriage and hence non-arbitrary.  Just because we allow one clunker does not mean we have to allow all of them.  I’m not sure what the formal name of this fallacy is, but though you might know, since you committed the fallacy so egregiously.  Allow me to reiterate something from before, highlighting something you seem to have missed.

    “In general, men and women can procreate, so heterosexual marriages IN GENERAL are in line with Marriage; therefore, men and women are eligible for marriage IN GENERAL.  A broad acceptance of heterosexual marriage is thus defensible even if there are several cases, such as elderly marriage or infertility, where child rearing is pretty much out of the question.  In the same vein, homosexuals cannot procreate IN GENERAL, so they are not in line with Marriage; therefore, homosexuals are not eligible for marriage… Society operates by these general rules so that it need not institute outlandish measures such as fertility tests, legal childbearing obligations, and lie detector tests to determine if the couple’s “love is real”.  However, we do have incentives for childbearing (dependent deductions), stigmas for “golddiggers” and measures such as prenumptual agreements to ADDRESS these issues.  Let’s call this the doctrine of PROPORTIONALITY.  A society regulates the institution of marriage in accordance with its NECESSARY and otherwise CRUCIAL considerations, but does so in a general way that is proportionate to and reflective of THAT SOCIETY’S VALUES and PRIORITIES.”

    A society’s values, as well as proportionality issues, differentiate between the clunkers it accepts and those it rejects.  A society of people like me, because of my values, would include homosexuality amongst rejected clunkers.  Don’t worry though; I can assure you that I would reject some heterosexual clunkers as well, and with complete sincerity.  (By the way, since I am telling you that I am also rejecting some heterosexual clunkers, what now, pray tell, has become of my “arbitrary” bias against homosexuality?)

    And of course, about that  “awful” “problem with homosexuality” argument.  Perhaps I should not have been so off the cuff with the semantics.  Do you have a “problem” with pedophelia?  Do you think it is an “awful argument” to suggest that because of this problem, society should not recognize “marriages” between 50-year olds and 8-year olds?  It is also, of course, exclusionary.  You may say that it is not arbitrary to have a problem with pedophelia.  I will respond that neither is it arbitrary to view homosexuality as “problematic”.  Of course, I did not go into this, since it is an altogether different topic.

    Colin, just think that every time you go around assuming that inclusion is the greatest thing and that all “problems” with homosexuality just must be arbitrary, you are simply doing the equivalent of what an evangelical does when he simply assumes that the Word of God is final and that you are promoting “abominations”.  If you want to argue semantics with people in your bubble, that’s fine.  Unfortunately, we are not in the same bubble, so we both have to step out of our zones a bit in order to communicate.  I’m as perfectly capable of condescention as you; but I have spent too much time here to be satisfied with mustual condescention.

21. Pauly,

    1.  The denial of hyperessentialism about social practices and customs does not entail one embrace pedophilia, etc.  Homework: what fallacy is that?

    2.  The negation of hyperessentialism about social practices and customs does not entail either that everything is arbitrary and that you should be able to marry your toaster–if only!   Homework: what fallacy is that?  Hint–same as 1 above.

    3.  Hyperessentialism about concepts such as marriage is an extremely controversial position.  First, it’s not remotely clear it’s true (what method, for instance, does one use to find the essence of social practice x?  Where does this essence abide–in our DNA, in the Forms?  Will it be there even if we don’t write laws in light of it?  What meaning does it have if it’s not universally applicable?  And much, much more!).  Second, it’s not remotely clear you’ve found the essence of marriage.  The facts–the diversity of marriage forms–suggest otherwise.  This does not mean, of course, that “marriage” has no meaning at all–it just means it may, I say may, not have yours.   

    4.  Nonetheless, I think we’ve reached an impasse.  My sense is that you disagree strongly with these positions.

22. False Choice is my guess.

    I also want to let this go; but you are conflating my arguments here, so let me  straighten out some things that bug me before I give it a rest.

    This:
    Do you have a “problem” with pedophelia?  Do you think it is an “awful argument” to suggest that because of this problem, society should not recognize “marriages” between 50-year olds and 8-year olds?

    Was a response to this:
    “One should believe that homosexuals should not be allowed to marry, if one has a “problem” with homosexuals,”…is such an awful argument.

    I was simply drawing a parallel in the abstract.  I was not comparing homosexuality with pedophilia or making any connection between the marital essence (this link takes you to a real hyperessentialist) and pedophilia.

    2.  The negation of hyperessentialism about social practices and customs does not entail either that everything is arbitrary and that you should be able to marry your toaster–if only!

    True, but “hyperessentialism” is name-calling.  You are conflating my *ahem* hyperbolic flourishes with my actual argument.

    Try these:  (I’m an easy teacher.  I tend to keep the homework at a Yes/No level.)

    This does not mean, of course, that “marriage” has no meaning at all–it just means it may, I say may, not have yours.

    1.) Would the history of marriage justify someone/some culture coming to the conclusion that marriage and family are indeed inextricably intertwined?
    2.)Re: Marriage/marriage: Are institutions allowed to make ‘arbitrary’ distinctions that comply with general guidlines of what the institution is supposed to be about?”  For example, can an engineering firm require a degree even though there are some people who are bright enough to work in them without degrees, and thus there is no necessary link between the job and the degree?

    3.) Are these arguments parallel?:

    a) Since we recognize non-Marriages as marriages for heterosexuals, we are morally obligated to recognize non-Marriages as marriages for homosexuals, unless there is some non-arbitrary reason to differentiate.-Colin

    b) The purpose of age requirements is to block those who are supposedly not mature enough/wise enough to vote.  But surely there are some 40-yr.-olds who are more ignorant and immature than some 20-yr.-olds.  Since we recognize some ignoramuses as being allowed to vote, we are morally obligated to recognize all ignoramuses, unless there is some non-arbitrary reason to differentiate.  Therefore, all age restrictions on voting are wrong.

    4.)Thus, since voting uses age as a proxy for wisdom, and firms use degrees as a proxy for competence, and all institutions use these types of proxies in one way or another, why can’t marriage use heterosexuality as a proxy for family production?

    I recognize how #4) can be abused.  You can suggest a link between Christianity and Goodness and thus only allow Christians to be Judges, or a link between atheism and intelligence and only allow atheists in college.  However, I don’t think these abuses justify tearing the whole idea down.  A policy of limiting the military to men, for example, is reasonable if we find that sexual integration causes more problems than it solves.  Yes, this results in unjustified “discrimination” for individual cases; but I generally think that this sort of discrimination can sometimes be justified if it leads to a greater good.

    If you do not think the family-oriented vision of marriage is that important, or you don’t think homosexual “marriage” will threaten it, and you do  not consider homosexuality itself to be problematic, you have every right to endorse homosexual marriage.  I, however, affirm all three of these points, so I oppose it.

23. This should read: However, I don’t think the potential for these abuses justify tearing the whole idea down.

24. Anyway, I don’t think hyperessentialism is name calling, as in fact you do think that social institutions have real, inviolable “essences,” completely independent of their realizations.  The truth, coherence, and so  on, of that view has been suspect for a very long time.   Its application to cultural artifacts goes well beyond it typical scope and poses an even higher burden for the kind of inference you want to make.  So let me answer your questions.  You ask:

    1.) Would the history of marriage justify someone/some culture coming to the conclusion that marriage and family are indeed inextricably intertwined?

    Not “inextricably.”  Not “family” in your sense.  And the history of marriage doesn’t justify your strong essentialism about it.  Nor does the biology.

    2.)Re: Marriage/marriage: Are institutions allowed to make ‘arbitrary’ distinctions that comply with general guidlines of what the institution is supposed to be about?”  For example, can an engineering firm require a degree even though there are some people who are bright enough to work in them without degrees, and thus there is no necessary link between the job and the degree?

    First, the analogy is inapt.  Second, “supposed to be about” is what we are arguing about here.  You have asserted that Marriage with a capital M is what any marriage is supposed to be about.  I have objected to that claim on the grounds that Marriage with a capital M is not an inviolable essence.  That we have concepts of social artifacts–or concepts at all for that matter–which we apply to particular circumstances (that we call one thing “marriage” and another “dating” for instance) does not entail these (1) are the real concepts in accordance with which we must order our world; (2) that these concepts have real independent existence from their various institutional forms; or (3) that these are the only possible concepts.

25. “And of course, about that  “awful” “problem with homosexuality” argument.  Perhaps I should not have been so off the cuff with the semantics.  Do you have a “problem” with pedophelia?  Do you think it is an “awful argument” to suggest that because of this problem, society should not recognize “marriages” between 50-year olds and 8-year olds?  It is also, of course, exclusionary.  You may say that it is not arbitrary to have a problem with pedophelia.  I will respond that neither is it arbitrary to view homosexuality as “problematic”.  Of course, I did not go into this, since it is an altogether different topic.”

    The point is that the “problem” with pedophilia is not because of some putative biological or transhistorical essence that rules it out. The point is that the argument against pedophilia is an independent moral argument appealing to notions of consent, and the possibility of giving consent. If you can formulate a coherent argument for the injustice of homosexuality then you might have some reasonable ground for your conclusion and it would not require all of the arguments appealing to tradition and Marriage/marriage, which as I think we have seen do nothing to establish the conclusion (and if I’m right cannot as a matter of logic do so).

    Your slippery slopes that claim that if we recognize homosexual marriages then there is no reason to not recognize pedophilic marraiges or marriages between persons and objects are vacuous, since as both j. and I have pointed out, there are plenty of good reasons for distinguishing them.

    The point once again is that even granting a fairly robust notion of Marriage (something J. is less willing than I to do), your argument does not succeed in estabishing its conclusion. In fact I think that the notion of Marriage does virtually no work in the real argument, which would have to be a social, political, moral argument against homosexual relationships analogous to our very strong moral arguments against pedophiliac relationships. Until such an argument is given, I think that the analysis has shown that there is no non-question-begging secular argument strong enough to justify the conclusion for the reasons that we have hammered out for the past 50 or so comments. And in the absence of that I think I will tentatively assume that some people just have irrational “problems” with homosexuality and there is little more to be said at that point.

26. Colin says: “The point is that the argument against pedophilia is an independent moral argument appealing to notions of consent, and the possibility of giving consent.”

    (So the main problem with pedophilia is that the children do not give consent.  Similarly, the main problem with forcing a child to eat his peas is that the child does not give consent.  It has nothing to do with anything substantive at all, except consent, preferences and choice.  Because children cannot give consent, we have a “very strong moral argument”, against both pedophilia and eating vegetables.)

    Casey says: “And the history of marriage doesn’t justify your strong essentialism about it.  Nor does the biology.”

    I now understand why Casey does not recognize marriage as an entity independent from its specific institutionalization.  She is ontologically forbidden from doing so.  To Casey, the physical existence of things and the fact of human preferences is is all there is.  (Casey thinks he is observing this, but he is really assuming it.  Otherwise it would be impossible for him to deny that an institution that has been universally understood primarily as “a family thing” for an enormous amount of reasons that I have gone at great pains to demonstrate, at least might in fact be a family thing; and he would definitely not go further still and deny the right of any society to consider it such. Casey is essentially doing every society that has ever existed the favor of defining its institutions accurately, which is to say, in accordance with Casey’s assumptions, not observations or inferences.

    Indeed, this degenerated ontology is what Modern Liberalism is.  Modern substantive liberals only recognize choice, preferences, and physical phenomena as real things.  This is how liberals come to the conclusion that all non-liberal societies are oppressively discriminatory.  It works like this.

    If choice, preference, and physcal nature is the only reality we recognize, then discrimination (the arbitrary denial of someone’s preferred action) is a prima face injustice.  (This leads to the absurd conclusion that it is only wrong to kill someone, or make them eat peas, or violate their sexuality or youth, because it is against their will.  A saner way of thinking about it, IMO is to say that innocence is essential to youth and to violate youth in such a heinous way is unspeakably depraved.  The Liberal, on the other hand, while still using the vocabulary of depravity, out of vestige, cannot consistently say that a man who entertains sexual fantasies about children is depraved in any way.  He simply wants something he’s not allowed to have, the way I might want my neighbor’s nice bycicle.  If children could give consent, there would be nothing wrong at all about a man getting nasty with 8 year old boys.)  Colin is so steeped in this liberal stew that he doesn’t even understand the extent to which he is begging the question.  He cannot imagine any objection to homosexuality that is not irrational.

    If, on the other hand, marriage, sexuality, and other social institutions have essences, it can justify exclusions  of some sort, and even necessitate them.

    So, in the end, it comes down to this. I think that there is a way things ought to be that is based on nature and the Good and is to some extent independent of individual preferences.  I think this holds for most institutions, and indeed, most things, except for those that are built for convenience and functionality, like a dishwasher.  I think that things like loyalty, fidelity, masculinity, femininity, family, etc. have a reality in and of themselves that implies how they ought to be practices (please don’t talk to me about the fact/value distinction, as that’s yet another discussion.)  These “oughts” sometimes entail exclusion.

    You think that the very notion of things having value apart from human preferences is absurd.  The physical reality of existence is “all there is”, combined with the self-evident preferences of people.  You think that this means all discrimination is unjust.  (I would even argue that this would follow, even from your premises, but there it is.)  You also think that for anyone else to insist upon an independent reality of anything beyond its physical reality, and to base an argument or policy from that reality, is to base it on a counter-factual, and to thus irrationally discriminate.  Note, however, the appeal to Liberal Ontology in establishing the counter-factual, and hence the question-begging.

    But, virtually all non-liberal cultural institutions recognize essences in some way.  Therefore, every cultural institution from any place and any time that assumes an essence to anything  has to be redefined (at times radically so) to conform with liberal ontology or be unjust and discriminatory. Liberalism, in the name of tolerance, has abolished everything in its sight that does not conform to its idiosyncratic and dubious metaphysics.

    In short, you’re Liberals; I ain’t.  Being Liberals, you think that anything non-Liberal is beyond the pale.  Being non-Liberal, I can accept some forms of cultural dissagreement (though not all, see sati, female circumcision, etc.) while holding the narrow, impossible, and degenerated ontology of Liberalism in contempt.

    Perhaps that can satisfactoraly resolve things.

27. *He* is ontologically forbidden from doing so.

    Forgive me; I have a female friend named Casey.  You know how it is.

28. It can resolve things, because this sort of ad hominem circumstantial argument (nevermind the absurd analogy between peas and pedophilia)  just isn’t worth substantive response.  Argument ad liberalism is not a reasonable argument in favor of positing an eternal essence for marriage, anymore than it would be a reasonable argument in favor of positing an eternal essence of cutlery arrangement. The problem throughout has been the inadequacy of the arguments for a) demonstrating that marriage has an essence and b) demonstrating that that essence underwrites the sort of exclusion your” problems” with homosexuality leads you to desire.  This latest fallacy does nothing to correct the inadequacies of these arguments. Your argument amounts to and has always amounted to:

    1. Homosexuals cannot Marry.

    2. Homosexuals should not be allowed to marry.

    This argument, as has been repeatedly shown, is question-begging whether or not we are liberals.

29. I don’t know.

    <A HREF=”http://www.236.com/video/2009/a_236_propaganda_production_ga_11005.php”>This</A> made a lot of good points, I think, and really helped clarify things for me.

30. Oh good grief.

    Link: http://www.236.com/video/2009/a_236_propaganda_production_ga_11005.php

31. I am not a philosopher, so I see this argument in a different way.

    Is the value of a right undermined if  one group advocates denying it to a certain class of people?

    Implications of Interventionalism: Does the “taking of sides” in a personal matter of morality undermine the government’s claim to impartiality with respect to rights?
    If the state (or individuals acting on its behalf)  has the right to deny gay marriage, does that imply it also has the right to deny other rights directly or indirectly related to homosexual activity?

    For the record, as a 43 year old single heterosexual  man doing online dating (and seeking marriage), I find this discussion about the procreative nature of marriage offputting. First, by focusing on biological potential, aren’t you essentially declaring some kinds of “legitimate” kinds of heterosexual marriage as inferior or less genuine? Does nonprocreative heterosexual  marriage demean Marriage (yes, marriage with a capital M)? 

    Second, many of the dating profiles I see are divorcees with children or wealthy single women who have adopted children. So for me, entering the marriage contract would have nothing to do with attaining some biological goal. Instead, it means  assuming the role  of caretaker for children in whom I have no biological stake.

    Pauly D   seems to have a benign attitude towards these kinds of nonprocreative relations. Let me ask Pauly D a question: If I accept all of your claims about Marriage, does that mean that I should favor  online dating profiles where  there was a higher possibility of having a biological child? Or should that not be a consideration at all?

32. Colin has a habit of obliviously proving my points for me.

    Argument ad liberalism is not a reasonable argument in favor of positing an eternal essence for marriage, anymore than it would be a reasonable argument in favor of positing an eternal essence of cutlery arrangement. The problem throughout has been the inadequacy of the arguments for a) demonstrating that marriage has an essence and b) demonstrating that that essence underwrites the sort of exclusion your” problems” with homosexuality leads you to desire.

    Colin, the reason why you are not convinced that Marriage has any essence is, as I said before, because you a priori deny essences.  It would be impossible for me to convince you that anything has any sort of eternal essence, because you reject the possibility out of hand.  The only reality you recognize is the physical world and its properties, and human will.  This is not your perception or your inference.  It is your epistemology.  Yo assume it to be true and disparage anyone who does not share your assumption. 

    Do you deny this?  If so, what essences do you recognize?  I really want to know!  What do you recognize as real in any way that isn’t derived either from physical reality or human will/preference?  Marriage would be an ideal example, because it is so obviously focused around family in all of its institutional elements; but you reject Marriage.  So what do you not reject?

    Also, the analogy between eating peas and pedophilia is absurd, but it’s not my absurdity; it is yours.  From your worldview, give me any justification for concerning pedophilia as anything more heinous than stealing a child’s wagon, if the criminal element of both acts lies in the absence of consent.   In your universe, all crimes and injustices are reducible to one crime: “I was forced to do/endure/ something I (on a scale of 1-10) did not want or denied the right to do/enjoy something I (on a scale of 1-10) did want on arbitrary grounds”.  All a Liberal can do (and yes, I am calling your epistemology Liberal, because that’s what it is) is simply change the numbers (or make a social argument that child-molestation is more socially undesirable than wagon stealing.)  If you say that the child has been fundamentally violated however, you abandon your metaphysics, because you are introducing an essence to childhood which is being violated.  You are saying not that the child has been made to endure something unpleasant, but that he has been wronged.  Liberals have an unprincipled exception for child-molestation because it has some shock-value to them; therefore they use this sort of essential language in this case even though it contradicts their philosophy. 

    An easy test to demonstrate this is suicide.  Suicide is, for the Liberal, no crime, because there is no absence of consent.  It is simply a person expressing his preferences.  If the Liberal protests suicide, he must argue that the potential victim is not rational, or sick in some way–not able to give consent.  If the suicidal person were to demonstrate his competence, however, the Liberal cannot morally prevent him from taking his own life.  Indeed, it would be immoral for the Liberal to do so.  To deem suicide wrong is to postulate a value of life independent of the opinion of the living.  It would be to say “Life is Good”.

    Liberals used to make an unprincipled exception for suicide far more than they do now.  However, basic rationality has a way of bulldozing through cognitive dissonance, and now Liberals increasingly hold views on suicide that are philosophically consistent.

    As for (b), the essence of marriage providing a basis for exclusion, I made the argument with the voting law.  There are some 17-yr-olds who are more advanced than many 40-yr-olds.  Yet, society bars them from the “rights and priveledges” of voting, amongst other things.  It is a perfect parallel, which is why you don’t address it.  Society has a criteria that it cannot enforce perfectly so it draws a line somewhere.  All societies in the history of the world until the last 10 years have put homosexual marriage on the outside of that line.  Thank Heavens Colin and Casey are here to show us how homophobic they were!  If only they gave a damn.

33. Mr. Nagle writes:
    Second, many of the dating profiles I see are divorcees with children or wealthy single women who have adopted children. So for me, entering the marriage contract would have nothing to do with attaining some biological goal. Instead, it means  assuming the role  of caretaker for children in whom I have no biological stake.
    Pauly D   seems to have a benign attitude towards these kinds of nonprocreative relations. Let me ask Pauly D a question: If I accept all of your claims about Marriage, does that mean that I should favor  online dating profiles where  there was a higher possibility of having a biological child? Or should that not be a consideration at all?
    First of all, I want to thank Mr. Nagle for not adopting the condescending and adversarial tone into which the correspondence between Colin and I has unfortunately degenerated.
    Second, I am not going to tell any individual why they should get married.  However, what I will say–and I think we can see somewhat eye to eye on this–is that if the world were composed of 45-yr-old men seeking women without the intention of procreating, marriage would be of no purpose.  It would not make sense as an institution without family formation.  I will ask Mr. Nagle to think of his home life when he was a child.  The idea of marriage is more about enabling the life of young Mr. Nagle and the Sr. Nagles (assuming Mr. Nagle had a typical home life of 1-2 generations ago).  When we think of marriage, we think of romantic love and companionship; but we also think of money, living arrangements, caring for the children, developing family trust, religion, fidelity, etc.  In the thick of marriage, the love lives of the spouses become a tertiary consideration at best, as all becomes focused on the household.
    In our society, romantic love and companionship have been emphasized in marriage, as has individuality, so people can conceive of a marriage such as you propose.  But this was not always the case.  There were times when the marriage you speak of would have drawn confused stares from across the room; there were times when marriage was an affair in which both families had a lot to say in the matter, when religious considerations and economic class were of huge importance, and when love was tertiary–in other words, new marriages were conceived as mature marriages are today.  Romantic love/commitment has been emphasized in our society to the point where the marriage you describe, and even homosexual marriage, is conceivable.  People see marriage as a man and a woman who love each other committing to each other.  My political position is that I wish to de-emphasize “commitment” for its own sake and re-emphasize family, so that both these marriages would become less conceivable.  I would prefer people say “Marriage is the process by  which one man and one woman come together in matrimony and become the basis of the family unit”.  In this case, both you, your bride to be, and a homosexual couple would be less inclined to conceive their own actions as marriage.  I don’t want to go back to arranged marriages, but if someone did, I would respect his right to argue it, just as I respect Colin’s right to promote homosexual marriage.
    Why do I hold this position?  Because romance/commitment are by themselves not sustainable bases for marriage.  Commitment for its own sake has little real or biological underpinning (especially for men) or social purpose other than family stability; and if people forget that marriage has something to do with family, one would expect divorce to increase, as without thinking of the family, the rational and motivation for commitment is weak.  Thus the increase in divorce.   Also, disconnect marriage from family and you open the door to illegitimacy.  You have lost the power to insist that children be born into wedlock, since you a priori sever the connection.  (You might as well insist that children be born into a book club.)  Surprise, illegitimacy rises.  When people see no link between marriage and family, marriage will have died already.  This will take awhile because we still hold these assumptions and these pictures in our heads of a husband, a wife, 2 kids, and a dog.  Even most Liberals can’t be completely neutral between a family with a father or a family without one; even they can’t see marriage and family as totally superfluous to each other; so ingrained is the imagery.  I want to keep it this way.  I prefer it to one woman with seven kids from five fathers; I prefer it to shopping for children, I prefer it to one father and seven concubines, and I most definitely prefer it to a homosexual couple with three adopted boys.
    An interesting point is this.  What about the difference between these three statements:
    This:
    1.) Marriage is a man and a woman joined together in matrimony to become the basis of the family unit.
    This:
    2.)  Marriage is two persons joined together in matrimony to become the basis of the family unit.
    And, for that matter, this:
    3.)  Marriage is two or more persons joined together in matrimony to become the basis of the family unit.
    The second leaves theoretical room for homosexual marriage, and the third for polygamy.  The first does not.  To avoid begging the question, one has to say that there is a reason why traditional marriage is the best and the rightful way to organize a society.  That could be gender-neutral, but it need not be.  I think homosexual marriage violates the spirit of marriage enough that you could plausibly go for #2 and still reject homosexual marriage.  But I don’t think it’s necessary to go to those lengths.  We don’t recognize polygamy, and few people feel the need to redefine marriage to include multiple partners of any given sex, because they agree that monogamy is better and more “correct” than polygamy.  (Liberals cannot consistently say this, but for the most part they make an unprincipled exception here.)  It’s possible to say the same with homosexual monogamy vs. heterosexual monogamy, first because of the mother-father family dynamic, secondly because of the gruesome and unhealthy attributes of sodomy, and thirdly because of other attributes of homosexual behavior that can be described as aberrant and grotesque.
    Colin, if he’s interested any more, will get on my case about this.  But that’s okay.  After all, there is no argument Colin can make about the “rightness” of homosexual behavior that I cannot also make about the rightness about bestiality.  Colin probably finds bestiality disgusting, but his visceral emotions have nothing to do with “rightness”.  If Colin cites public health concerns, I can counterargue with AIDS.  (I can imagine Colin saying that the issue with bestiality–and marrying your puppy!, after all, children are probably better off with a puppy to take care of than without, so you can argue for inclusion on utilitarian grounds there!–is the absence of consent on behalf of the doggy. Liberalism parodies itself rather quickly when tested like this.)
     

34. Oudemia

    I see you are arguing by social pressure and mockery!  I actually endorse your methods!

    Allow me to reciprocate.

    First, let’s level the playing field.  You got me in this predominately leftish site. (And you really got me good! I’ll admit it!)  So next, we’ll move to Patterson, NJ in a predominately Muslim area with both black and Arab Muslims.  Then, I’ll let you show the film.  Call it A Wholesome Slice of Life; (just don’t associate me with it).  Then we’ll show your film, but we’ll spice it up!  We’ll pad it with a ton of gratuitous simulated gay sex and gay make-out sessions!  And we can add some nice camp satire of the “Adam and Steve” variety and their wild and crazy misadventures as they make mischief with the local Imam!

    Then, I shall argue by social pressure and mockery; only the context will be slightly different.

    Or, we can maintain the good faith principle here and argue respectfully.  I’ll leave that decision up to you.

35. “Colin, the reason why you are not convinced that Marriage has any essence is, as I said before,
    because you a priori deny essences. ”

    First, this is simply false. In fact, I have granted that there is such a thing as a biological disposition towards “pair-mating.” This may not be the sort of essence that you are looking for, but the claims that you make about the concealed metaphysical and political reasons behind the explicit views stated in my comments are unfounded and irrelevant. I do not have to argue that there are no essences, nor that there are some essences, in order to argue that you have given no good reason for believing that there is an essence of Marriage that is robust enough to provide a normative ground for the exclusion of homosexuals from marriage. My views about the whether there are essences of mathematical objects, or collections of necessary truths surrounding the behavior of physical objects, or even non-preference dependent objective truths in morality are all independent of the arguments that we are analyzing and the response that I have articulated to the your argument. If you would stop trying to change the subject with your straw man arguments we would make better progress in this conversation.

    Second, to claim that lack of consent in pedophiliac relations is a ground for considering them immoral does not entail that all non-consensual behaviors are immoral. Once again, because you refuse to engage the actual assertions that are being made in these comments, you replace what I said with very silly claim that I would never make a) all non-consensual behaviors are wrong, and then try to use that to refute what I actually said. This is a classic straw man (I think this is the thread with the largest number of textbook quality logical fallacies committed in almost four years of the nonsequitur!). But, once again, you are changing the subject because in order to make your argument for exclusion of homosexuals from the instituion of marraige–as we have seen–you must argue that homosexuality is immoral in some way. Claiming that if I reject this, then I have not ground to hold pedophilia to be immoral is fatuous at best, as is the line of argument about consent and peas that you have pursued here.

    Third, your argument about innocence is in far worse shape than the consent argument, since it would (assuming that you would generalize to I) All actions that corupt the innocence of children are immoral (as immoral as pedophilia), it would make a) moral any pedophilia that did not deprive a child of their innocence and b) immoral the process of growing (becoming less innocent). While on the other hand, a general rule against non-consensual sexual relationships seems to be extremely important for any just society.

    Non-consensual sex (i.e. rape) is immoral for fairly obvious reasons having to do with consent–this has little to do with my being a liberal and does not exclude there being other reasons why things are immoral. This does not mean that making children take their medicine is immoral. There is also an argument about “abuse” that involves the exploitation of power imbalances. Then there are arguments concerning the moral virtues in which I would claim that the disposition to pedophilia is an ignoble one. Then I might invoke some sort of Categorical Imperative to argue that pedophilia is morally the equivalent of slavery since it involves using the child merely as a means. Then I might invoke a utilitarian type principle that argues that all things being equal an action that will tend to lead to much greater unhappiness than happiness for all considered is immoral.

    Your arguments about “worldviews” etc appear to me to be desperate attempts to avoid the issue at hands and to change the subject. Not only that, but like many arguments of this sort of generality and abstractness they are really awful arguments. {By the by, and for the readers at large as well: I’m curious about the origin of these arguments that conservatives (anti-liberals) like to trot out: “Liberals value tolerance, so they must tolerate the intolerance. Therefore, liberalism is self-contradictory. Does anyone actually make these arguments seriously? They are really awful and facile. Where do these school-boy logic tricks come from and why do so many people take them seriously?}

    If you would spend less time trying to make these silly political points and more time attending to the weakness of your arguments, we might make more progress in this conversation. There is really little that is so obviously a sign of fallacies in the offing as your “argumentum ad liberalism”–I don’t know why this so obviously awful argument is so popular with many conservatives these days, I have my suspicions.

36. “As for (b), the essence of marriage providing a basis for exclusion, I made the argument with the voting law.  There are some 17-yr-olds who are more advanced than many 40-yr-olds.  Yet, society bars them from the “rights and priveledges” of voting, amongst other things.  It is a perfect parallel, which is why you don’t address it.  Society has a criteria that it cannot enforce perfectly so it draws a line somewhere.  All societies in the history of the world until the last 10 years have put homosexual marriage on the outside of that line.  Thank Heavens Colin and Casey are here to show us how homophobic they were!  If only they gave a damn.”

    Actually, this isn’t a perfect parallel–unless you think that there is an essence to a “voter” that is undergirding that exclusion. The parallel is that sometimes abitrary exclusions are legitimate. If you want to argue this claim, then you would be ceding the point that the exclusion of homosexuals is arbitrary, but socially justified for some other reason (statistical likelihood of immaturity, lack of knowledge about the issues etc. might be a sort of explanation of why we exclude 17 year olds from voting–not sure that it’s a good reason). So what is the social justification for the arbitrary exclusion of homosexuals from marriage?

    Of course, you might reply that you aren’t admitting that excluding homosexuals arbitrarily is necessary, but then the point is not particularly relevant to the issue at hand. The problem once again is that this argument does not really address the point that you need to address to respond to the critiques.

37. Dear Pauly D,

    It’s clear to me, in any case, that you have very little clear sense of what essentialism is, what sorts of things might have essences, how we might know what those essences (do we know them a priori? a posteriori?  by deduction? by induction? by observation? by calculation?), whether we have some obligation to instantiate those essences when they don’t instantiate themselves (Marriage may have an esssence, but so does murder–must we instantiate that?).  Nor do you have any clear sense of whether these essences are also a moral ideal established by biology, or by the order of being, or by God, or by some other factor.  Nor is it clear to me what the penalties are for ignoring the essences of which you speak.  Nor do you have any sense of the relation between the essences and their instances (are they related by identity? by resemblance, by participation?  by something else?). And more. 

    Please, however, do not bother answering these objections , as you so often have, by alleging that I endorse nominalism and therefore for me anything goes.  And please also do not say that if there is no essence of marriage or family or whatever that anything goes.  Or that if you allow homosexuality you also allow bestiality, or any of the other textbook examples of fallacious reasoning you have offered in response to very straightforward and obvious philosophical questions about the nature of essences, which is, by the way, what this thread has been all about.

    Judging by your frequent and irrelevant invocations of Clintonism and Liberalism and many other absurdities that will mess up our spam filter, you’re not interested in discussing these questions at all in the manner proposed in this or the other thread.  You’ve made your point anyway, so perhaps it’s time to move on.

38. Dear Colin

    OK.  Backtrack.

    First, a preliminary.  Homosexuals can marry.  Same-sex marriage is not acknowledged; but anybody, regardless of sexual orientation can marry heterosexually.  Attn: This is not as trivial, callous, and silly as it may look at first.  Bear with me. The institution is defined a certain way; and within those parameters, anybody can participate.  Obviously, homosexuals cannot take advantage of a heterosexual institution in the way heterosexuals can, but that is different from legal discrimination.  It’s a legal formality, and somewhat callous, but it is nonetheless the case.  There is a difference between demanding that an institution accommodate your preferences and demanding to be allowed to participate in the institution.  Currently, homosexuals who favor small government and low taxes can join the Republican Party.  They would probably prefer that the Republicans be more accepting of homosexuality, but one must recognize the distinction between the Republican Party putting a “No Homosexuals Allowed” sign and the homosexual demanding that the Republicans change so that the homosexuals would desire participating.  The same would go for Pro-Life Democrats (like Nat Hentoff).

    Here is the difference.  Marriage is a public institution that confers rights and privileges, and conceiving it as a heterosexual institution de facto restricts a certain class of people from enjoying these privileges.  It stands to reason that there had better be a good reason for this de facto exclusion.

    But even acknowledging this, one must real issue then is with the institution of marriage itself, in this particular aspect.  You are saying that the institution is flawed because it excludes arbitrarily.  But the fact remains that you want to change the institution itself as it is fundementally concieved, which is different from simply allowing a heretofore excluded groups participate in an institution that is otherwise left intact.

    Now, a society conceives its institutions in accordance to its understanding of reality and the values derived from that understanding.  Western marriage comes from a vision of a man and a woman uniting in matrimony to “become one flesh” and establish a family.  It is based on  understandings of the natural order of things, and what things fundamentally are.  Same-sex marriage is simply out of sync with this vision in a host of ways.  For one thing, where is the family? 

    All of these objections about adoption and middle-aged marriage are actually of marginal relevance.  Adoption is a child-welfare program, not an alternate means of acquiring children, although for infertile couples adoption can function as such a resource.  When you say that homosexual “marriages” should be recognized because adoption renders all family objections irrelevant, it’s almost like saying that marriage should be altered because homosexuals can participate in UNICEF.  (Note the hyperboly and equivication.  You can spare your me your pomposity in this case.)  Adoption is a measure taken when the system breaks down, and is thus dependent on and a component of the system that is being challenged.  You can’t just use it to recconceive the system.  You can’t use the contingency that the recourse to adopt is at times necessary to disconnect childrearing from childbearing in principle.  And, conversely, you can’t use the contingency of infertile couples or elderly marriages to negate the connection in principle between childbearing and heterosexuality.  Heterosexual marriages are fertile or infertile depending on circumstances.  Homosexual couples are infertile in their very nature.  It’s like saying that David Wright swings and misses some of the time, therefore it’s discriminatory not to allow blind men to play baseball.

    Now, let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that a baby-making machine existed.  Would that allow all sorts of ad hoc marriage arrangements?  Well, such a machine would be the mother of all contingencies.  If you don’t believe in any reality outside of contingency, you would say “this negates everything!’.  If you believe that there is a natural essence of things, it would change little, and you would be deeply wary of a machine that manufactured human beings.

    Let us take one more argument of yours.

    “As for (b), the essence of marriage providing a basis for exclusion, I made the argument with the voting law.  There are some 17-yr-olds who are more advanced than many 40-yr-olds.  Yet, society bars them from the “rights and priveledges” of voting, amongst other things….  Society has a criteria that it cannot enforce perfectly so it draws a line somewhere….
    
    Actually, this isn’t a perfect parallel–unless you think that there is an essence to a “voter” that is undergirding that exclusion. The parallel is that sometimes abitrary exclusions are legitimate. If you want to argue this claim, then you would be ceding the point that the exclusion of homosexuals is arbitrary, but socially justified for some other reason.
    (There are indeed several fallacies in this thread, such as this one.  They are the result of a quick and heated back and forth more than any special stupidity on any of our parts, and it is my opinion that we both should be more patient with each other and less condescending than we are now.  You might fancy yourself as the guardian of reason against a torrent of irrationality and idiocy.  To put it kindly, you are not coming across that way.)
    The whole point of the analogy is that the exclusion is not arbitrary. If it were arbitrary, there would be no need to draw the line at all.  It is only the exact placement of the line (18 years rather than 17.5) that contains elements of arbitrariness,  as  The rationale for the line itself is very much real, which is why it is not arbitrary to exclude 3-year olds from the democratic process.  (Even placing it at 18 instead of 21 was not arbitrary, as it involved arguments concerning kids going to war without political representation.)  This rationale is an understanding of the democratic process being the domain of responsible and informed citizens, as well as an understanding that young children in the vast majority of cases do not qualify as such.  Unfortunately, the law is a blunt instrument that does not allow for case-by-case examinations that can preserve pure rationality.  If that is the burden of proof  you demand to justify any exclusion, than you would have to eliminate all restrictions of all kinds, which is where your logic inevitably leads.  Analogously here, homosexual “marriage” would be the equivalent of the three-year-old voter.
    But back to the story.  The family issue is only one reason why homosexual marriage does not mesh with the idea of the institution.  Another little thing is it’s homosexual.   I remain convinced that it is defensible to derive marriage as a heterosexual institution purely from its family underpinnings, though I also conceded that it was not strictly necessary.  The question then becomes, if it is not necessary, why exclude homsexuals?  I gave reasons of the relative emphasis this would give to love/commitment vs. family as grounds, and I still think those grounds hold.
    But I did all this almost as an exercise.  I didn’t need to.  What is at stake is the right of a society to share a common understanding–a cultural consenses–of what is Good, what is Right, and what is Real.  If a society conceives of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, based on an entire Universe of understandings about the way things are and ought to be, we cannot out of hand deny this right to the society.  Certainly the challenge that is is uninclusive is not sufficient grounds to reconstruct the institution, because all social essences will be exclusive to a degree.  The military was understood as a masculine institution, until the inclusivists came and said they could not prove by a syllogism why certain women should not be allowed to enter.  A society that was less concerned with inclusion that this would have said that women in the military, in addition to causing logistical problems that would vastly outweigh the benefits to the institution and the concerns of “justice”, is an affront to the natures of both sexes.
    I understand that this can be abused.  What if a society decides upon a vision of the Good etc. that involves some Pure Race killing everyone?  I would say that this is a straw man.  Just discriminations are based on rational understandings of the nature of things; and there is no true and honestunderstanding of the nature of things that can rationally lead to something like Naziism.
    The reason why I began to challenge (and assume, if you’ll pardon me for doing so) your underlying metaphysics is that I detected in your reasoning a hostility to any vision of the nature of things that is not rooted in an extremely concrete and contingent understanding of reality that includes free will, preferences, the physical universe, and not much else.   You somehow do not acknowledge that if marriage is essentially a familial institution, that homosexual “marriages” are contrary to the spirit of the institution, based only on circumstantial/provisional things like adoption, infertility, or In-Vitro?  In that case, how can I help but conclude that you don’t recognize anything other than contingent reality and deny the essential reality of things and the right of societies to recognize–to the best of their ability–these essential realities and to act accordingly, even if these realities discriminate?
    My argument is not the insipid “You are tolerant, thus you do not tolerate intolerance; thus you contradict yourself argument.  You are simply caricaturing an argument with which you are unfamiliar before bothering to grasp it.  Get over yourself.

39. *hyperbole*

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