Category Archives: General discussion

Anything else.

General discussion, Op-Eds and other opinions, Unclassifiable

Whatsa Matta Yoo?

A Justice Deparment lawyer, John Yoo (now a law professor at Berkeley–that’s liberal academia for you), put together a legal memo in 2003 that amounted to a justification of the President’s right to torture people in his capacity as Commander in Chief in time of war.  Here’s a critical passage in that argument:

As we have made clear in other opinions involving the war against al Qaeda, the Nation’s right to self-defense has been triggered by the events of September 11. If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions. This national and international version of the right to self-defense could supplement and bolster the government defendant’s individual right.

One reason you torture someone is to discover information (whether that information is any good is another matter).  You might also torture someone for fun or for punishment.  But the relevant sense of torture for this memo is the former–torture for information about the future.  Yoo argues that if you put "information discovery" under the broader rubric of self-defense, then you can torture anyone at any time, so long as you are attempting to "prevent future attacks" (which would probably characterize any interrogation after all).

That seems to be a rather vague standard, as it could be invoked to justify any instance of interrogation torture.  But the weird thing here is that Yoo would construe this national right of self-defense (which applies I would guess to war) as applicable to individual torturers.  Any particular defendant who torturers a suspect for information, you see, is merely engaging in a completely justifiable act of personal self-defense.

 

General discussion, Michael Gerson, Unclassifiable

Impartial birth abortion

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Here’s Gerson today:

Sen. Robert P. Casey Jr.’s endorsement of Barack Obama last week — "I
believe in this guy like I’ve never believed in a candidate in my life"
— recalled another dramatic moment in Democratic politics. In the
summer of 1992, as Bill Clinton solidified his control over the Democratic Party,
Robert P. Casey Sr., the senator’s father, was banned from speaking to
the Democratic convention for the heresy of being pro-life.

The elder Casey (now deceased) was then the governor of Pennsylvania
— one of the most prominent elected Democrats in the country. He was
an economic progressive in the Roosevelt tradition. But his Irish
Catholic conscience led him to oppose abortion. So the Clintons chose
to humiliate him. It was a sign and a warning of much mean-spirited
pettiness to come.

The younger Casey, no doubt, is a sincere fan of Obama. He also must have found it satisfying to help along the cycle of political justice.

But by Casey’s father’s standard of social justice for the unborn, Obama is badly lacking.

The first part is just false (as many have demonstrated).  Casey did not endorse the democratic candidates and so was not invited to speak at the podium.  Later Gerson–some Christian he–goes on to distort a remark of Diane Feinstein.  Gerson writes:

These trends reached their logical culmination during a congressional
debate on partial-birth abortion in 1999. When Democratic Sen. Barbara Boxer was pressed to affirm that she opposed the medical killing of children after
birth, she refused to commit, saying that children deserve legal
protection only "when you bring your baby home." It was unclear whether
this included the car trip.

Nice one, Gerson.  Here’s what Feinstein actually said:

I would make this statement: That this Constitution, as it
currently is — some of you want to amend it to say that life begins at
conception. I think when you bring your baby home, when your baby is born — and
there is no such thing as partial-birth — the baby belongs to your family and
has all the rights. But I am not willing to amend the Constitution to say that a
fetus is a person, which I know you would.

Gerson’s remark is clearly distorted.  Dear Mr. Gerson, someone once said the truth will set you free.

The last part, "social justice for the unborn," is curious for another reason.  Obama is pro-choice.  As a result, he doesn’t think the unborn are the subjects of justice, as Gerson obviously does.  Gerson goes on to argue:

But Obama’s record on abortion is extreme. He opposed the ban on
partial-birth abortion — a practice a fellow Democrat, the late Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, once called "too close to infanticide." Obama
strongly criticized the Supreme Court decision upholding the
partial-birth ban. In the Illinois state Senate, he opposed a bill similar to the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, which prevents the killing of infants mistakenly left alive by abortion. And now Obama has oddly claimed that he would not want his daughters to be "punished with a baby" because of a crisis
pregnancy — hardly a welcoming attitude toward new life.

Obama doesn’t have a "welcoming attitude" (what that means baffles) toward new life because he’s pro-choice (and it turns out, by the way, that Gerson twisted Obama’s words–that’s three!).  Gerson’s argument doesn’t do anything other than point out that Obama is pro-choice.  But Gerson takes his having pointed this out as some kind of reason to think Obama is wrong.  Maybe Obama’s view is wrong–but it’s not wrong because he holds  it. 

General discussion

“Post modern”

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Neal Gabler’s NYTimes piece about John McCain’s success with the media is entertaining.  Here’s snippet:

Seeming to view himself and the whole political process with a mix of
amusement and bemusement, Mr. McCain is an ironist wooing a group of
individuals who regard ironic detachment more highly than sincerity or
seriousness. He may be the first real postmodernist candidate for the
presidency — the first to turn his press relations into the basis of
his candidacy.

He’s right about McCain’s easy treatment in the media.  Just look at how often reporters attach McCain’s own branded adjectives to him–"maverick" or "straight-talker."  See Gabler’s piece for more.

I don’t think the post-modern part is true, however.  Candidates for office have been in the post-modern mode for a long time now.  I remember even Steve Forbes remarking on his "message," as if he were himself a political commentator describing the success of his own candidacy, rather than the candidate actually making his own pitch.  

But the post-modern mode, one might call it, infects much more than just political reporting.  One can find it all over liberal punditry–never making an argument, merely remarking on arguments made. 

Formal Fallacies, General discussion, Illicit major

Socrates is mortal

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Check out this entertaining trope from William Kristol’s op-ed today in the New York Times.  He gives three arguments that have the form of the enthymeme–the argument missing a conclusion or premise–but none of the validity necessary to make such arguments effective.   He writes:

But orators often ask themselves the convenient questions, not the difficult ones. And Barack Obama is an accomplished orator.

And

After all, politicians sometimes indulge in ridiculous and unfair
comparisons to make a point. And Barack Obama is an able politician.

And

But ambitious men sometimes do a disservice to the best in their own communities. And Barack Obama is an ambitious man.

As you can see, these have the form of a categorical syllogism–a two-premised deductive argument consisting of categorical statements.  Here’s a more famous example:

  • All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man.

Same form, save for the first premise.  For Kristol’s arguments here to be valid deductive ones (and perhaps sound ones as well), he needs to drop the qualifier (the "often" or "sometimes").  For his arguments might as well say:

  • Sometimes men are mortal, and indeed Socrates is a man.

Is Socrates mortal?  Can’t really tell by that argument.  Does Barack Obama do the things in the arguments above?  Can’t really tell.  He might or he might not.  But it doesn’t follow from the fact that he is a politician that he will engage in "ridiculous and unfair comparisons to make a point." 

Well, ok.  If we stretch the principle of charity to the breaking point, we might read the first premise another way:

  • All orators often ask themselves convenient questions. . . .
  • All politicians sometimes indulge. . . .
  • All ambitious men sometimes. . . .

That would make Kristol’s enthymemes valid, but ridiculously unsound.  Besides, that’s not what he means. 

General discussion

Spring Break 08

Sorry if you thought that title meant something–perhaps a play on "spring" or "break" or something like that.  Perhaps you also expected it to followed by commentary on some crazy op-ed article very few people even read let alone take seriously.  Nope.  While we’re gone, comments will continue to be appreciated, though not monitored or responded to (by me at least).  Have a good week everyone, especially you, op-ed writers of America.    

Argument Analysis, Stanley Fish, Unclassifiable

Fish hook

Stanley Fish laments:

The difference between making arguments and analyzing them is not
always recognized, and when it is missed, readers get outraged about
things I never said.

Denying such subtle philosophical distinctions–obvious to all–is what Stanley Fish often does in his columns.  I don’t mean this as an argumentum ad hominem tu quoque–you’re wrong Stanley because you do it  too–because, after all, he’s right, after all, about this.  Such distinctions ought to be a little more frequent in his columns (and radio "appearances"), especially when he critiques the arguments of others.  Here’s an example from today’s column:

He proceeds to write:

This distinction between tribal identity politics and policy or
interest identity politics could of course be challenged (as it was by
many posters), but the challenge would be to its cogency or adequacy,
not to its agenda, because it has none. The distinction is descriptive,
not normative. In offering it, I do not say, “practice identity
politics.” I only say that those who do take identity into
consideration either by voting for someone on the basis of an identity
affiliation or choosing a candidate because he or she is perceived to
be friendly to identity interests are not doing something patently
reprehensible.

Get that–he doesn’t say "practice identity politics," he says "it’s not wrong to practice identity politics."  For those who practice identity politics, "it’s not wrong to practice identity politics" is the same as "keep practicing identity politics–it’s ok really"  He’s making a distinction that regards what one ought to do (or ought not to do). 

But more to the point, Fish’s distinction in this passage regards–and I think we wrote about this a bit ago–the kind of non-distinction drawing about "identity politics" he complains about in others.  Fish asserts that any interest voting is "identity" politics.  That seems fine, but it has the air of a truism.  Besides, that’s not the kind of "identity politics" that people are talking about.  So calling every interest "identity" does nothing to address the issue that most people have with identity politics.  It’s like saying "everything is political."  May be true, but it’s uninformative.

General discussion, George Will, Good Arguments

New fallacies

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Courtesy of George Will, here’s a new fallacy (one he doesn’t commit, by the way):

U.S. policy toward Cuba should, however, be conditioned, and perhaps haunted, by U.S. policy toward China.
That policy was supposed to result in steady, slow-motion regime change
through candid subversion in broad daylight. The premise has been that
the cure for communism is commerce with the capitalist world. The
assumption is that capitalism brings, because it requires, an ethic of
trust and the rule of law in the form of promise-keeping (contracts).
Also, the protection of private property gives individuals a sphere of
sovereignty and whets their appetites for a politics of popular
sovereignty.


This has been called "the Starbucks
fallacy" (see James Mann’s book "The China Fantasy"): When people
become accustomed to many choices of coffee, they will demand many
political choices. This doctrine may be being refuted by the emergence
of a China that has become wealthier without becoming less
authoritarian.

In addition to this self-effacing tidbit, the rest of his op-ed today seemed a model of reasonableness.  It’s not so hard to do, really.

 

 

General discussion

The Stagirite

Here's Aristotle, on fallacies:

To reduce it to a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a thing, himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer, and the other upon the securing of one. Those, then, who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind will make a man seem to be wise, and this is the purpose they happen to have in view.

More at some other time. 

Bad Explanations, General discussion, Reporting

Primary race

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Puzzling words from the New York Times political team:

Mr. Obama has resisted any effort to suggest that the presidential primaries were breaking along racial lines.

“There are not a lot of African-Americans in Nebraska the last time I checked, or in Utah or in Idaho, areas where I probably won some of my biggest margins,” he said Sunday in an NPR interview.

“There’s no doubt that I’m getting more African-American votes,” he said, “but that doesn’t mean that the race is dividing along racial lines. You know, in places like Washington State we won across the board, from men, from women, from African-Americans, from whites and from Asians.”

A Rhetorical Tightrope

David Axelrod, the chief strategist of the Obama campaign, said in an interview that although he and Mr. Obama did not map out a detailed strategy for dealing with race when plotting a presidential run, they were well aware it would weigh on his campaign.

As a consultant to several black elected officials, Mr. Axelrod has been steeped in racially charged elections. And he said Mr. Obama had faced the challenges of racial politics in the campaign that propelled him to the Senate, where he is only the third black elected since Reconstruction.

Mr. Axelrod said he had learned there was “a certain physics” to winning votes across racial lines. Previous campaigns by African-Americans — the Rev. Jesse Jackson and the Rev. Al Sharpton — had overwhelmingly relied on black support that wound up defining, and confining, their candidacies.

By contrast, from the moment Mr. Obama stepped onto the national political stage, he has paid as much attention — or more, some aides said — to a far broader audience. “He believes you can have the support of the black community, appealing to the pride they feel in his candidacy, and still win support among whites,” Mr. Axelrod said.

While Obama resists efforts "to suggest," he is powerless against the very suggestive authors of this article (notice later: "Mr. Axelrod has been steeped in racially charged elections"–oh so suspicious, isn't it?).  I would add that the more proper way of characterizing Obama's position would be this: "The facts do not bear out that this primary race is a racially charged one."  After all, that's basically what Obama said.

Perhaps instead of framing Obama's position as a strategic denial, they could do some investigating, you know, research, and see if perhaps the racial issue warrants very suggestive front page coverage. 

Argument Analysis, Red Herring

Maledetti Toscani

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Augustinus docet:

"This," I said, "has become what they call a Tuscan argument: for this is the name they gave to an argument when instead of answering a difficulty, a man proposes another.  It was this that our poet. . . in his Ecologues judged fairly to be rustic and downright countryish: when one asks the other, where the heavens are no more than three ells broad, the other replies:

In what land do flowers grow engraved with the names of kings?" 

–Against the Academics (O'Meara trans).  Or, if you prefer:

[3.4.9] Hoc est, inquam, Tuscum illud iurgium, quod dici solet, cum quaestioni intentatae non eius solutio, sed alterius obiectio uidetur mederi. Quod etiam poeta noster — ut me aliquantum Licentii auribus dedam — decenter in Bucolico carmine hoc rusticanum et plane pastoricium esse iudicauit, cum alter alterum interrogat, ubi caeli spatium non amplius quam tres ulnas pateat, ille autem "quibus in terris inscripti nomina regum nascantur flores".