David Botting, “Interpretive Dilemmas”<\/p>\n
In what sense is argument independent of context?\u00c2\u00a0 Independent: logical form.\u00c2\u00a0 Dependent: identifying the form is a matter of interpretation, which depends on context.\u00c2\u00a0 So whether a fallacy has occurred depends on what is attributed to the arguer: (a) the argument form the speaker intends, and (b) the commitment of the speaker to the quality of argumQ: Ient.<\/p>\n
This yields interpretive dilemmas.\u00c2\u00a0 Interpreters must decide between (i) attributing fallacious argument forms, and (ii) holding that the speaker isn’t arguing or has a contextually appropriate version.\u00c2\u00a0 E.g.s:\u00c2\u00a0 Tu quoque taken as theoretical (fallacious) or replying to a demand from an inappropriate source, namely, a hypocrite (appropriate).\u00c2\u00a0 Argument from pity as theoretical (fallacious) or as practical (appropriate).\u00c2\u00a0 Argument from ignorance as demonstrative (fallacious) or as practical attitudes of defaults (relevant)<\/p>\n
Comment (The NS’s own John Casey): Here we have a case where we might be looking for good reasoning when there’s not any.\u00c2\u00a0 Can’t charity run amok?<\/p>\n
Q: Is there instead a trilemma, between fallacy, contextual non-fallacy, and non-argument?<\/p>\n
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David Botting, “Interpretive Dilemmas” In what sense is argument independent of context?\u00c2\u00a0 Independent: logical form.\u00c2\u00a0 Dependent: identifying the form is a matter of interpretation, which depends on context.\u00c2\u00a0 So whether a fallacy has occurred depends on what is attributed to the arguer: (a) the argument form the speaker intends, and (b) the commitment of the … Continue reading OSSA Day 2: Botting on Interpretive Dilemmas<\/span>