Brian MacPherson, “The Incompleteness Problem for the Virtue-Based Theory of Argumentation”<\/p>\n
Thesis & Argument:\u00c2\u00a0 James Rachels’ ‘incompleteness problem’ for virtue ethics can be inherited by theories of argumentative virtues.\u00c2\u00a0 The problem can be solved by a pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument.<\/p>\n
The incompleteness problem comes in two forms.\u00c2\u00a0 First, there’s no mechanism for conflicts between virtues (e.g.,\u00c2\u00a0 open-mindedness vs tenacity).\u00c2\u00a0 Second, there’s the question of why be virtuous.\u00c2\u00a0 In order to solve either, the V-theorist must go beyond the theory.<\/p>\n
If we go beyond the theory, the best option is to go to pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument.\u00c2\u00a0 We do better if we know, and virtuous arguers fare better in life both individually and collectively.<\/p>\n
Sheldon Wein’s comment: Challenge #1: Does incompleteness of ethical virtues mean in completeness of argumentative virtues?\u00c2\u00a0 Challenge #2: The supplement that (a) arguers do better individually and (b) they do better as groups.\u00c2\u00a0 The problem is that (a) and (b) also conflict.<\/p>\n
Q1: Pragmatic utility can sometimes be in terms of scientific progress, but isn’t this a case for an epistemic theory of argument?\u00c2\u00a0 Why not ground them in the sphere of experience of humans knowing?\u00c2\u00a0 Why not arbitrate in terms of achieving knowledge.<\/p>\n
Q2: If conflicts of virtue are resolved by other means, then what if those other means themselves conflict?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Brian MacPherson, “The Incompleteness Problem for the Virtue-Based Theory of Argumentation” Thesis & Argument:\u00c2\u00a0 James Rachels’ ‘incompleteness problem’ for virtue ethics can be inherited by theories of argumentative virtues.\u00c2\u00a0 The problem can be solved by a pragmatic utilitarian theory of argument. The incompleteness problem comes in two forms.\u00c2\u00a0 First, there’s no mechanism for conflicts between … Continue reading OSSA Day 1: MacPherson on Argumentative Virtue<\/span>