IGOR \u00c5\u00bd. \u00c5\u00bdAGAR (Educational Research Institute & Univ. of Maribor, Slovenia)
\n\tFallacies: Do We “Use” Them or “Commit” Them?<\/p>\n
Zagar poses two questions . First, an epistemological one: do we (everyone, politicians, the media…) commit fallacies, or do we (intentionally) use them? Second, a methodological one: when we (philosophers, sociologists, discourse analysts…) detect a fallacy, on what conceptual grounds do we differentiate between committed and used fallacies? Is there a difference?<\/p>\n
Eg1: "France is hexagonal" is only roughly true. It's not really true, but roughly so.<\/p>\n
Eg2: "Eisenhower won that battle" is only roughly true. The soldiers won the battle… but it's still acceptable.<\/p>\n
So: assessing good arguments (e.g., validity) requires a formal system to be brought in. They are translated into the system and evaluated according to that system. The question is whether we are using the appropriate criteria.<\/p>\n
Eg3: If A just wants to get B to accept p. A knows B accepts q, so A gives B the argument: 'q, therefore p.' Relative to the criterion of rhetorical success, A's argument is good.<\/p>\n
Can there be a classification of fallacies? Are they too unruly to classify? Are there fallacies at all? If some fallacies seem unavoidable and ever present, then perhaps we should be concerned about classifying it a fallacy.<\/p>\n
Eg4: Skepticism about induction becomes acceptance of inductive principles. Asserting from the consequent as abduction. Vicious circles to coherent systems.<\/p>\n
Some conclusions: we don't need to be inflating fallacy theory with more fallacies. Rather, we need to understand the right criteria to understand the various forms of argument we see. Context-dependence (kn owledge of the speakers, circumstances, purposes of discussion) of fallacy assessments, and once we do that, we see that appraisal and acceptability varies.<\/p>\n
Q1: One can evaluate arguments relative to context (e.g. in Walton's work and from the pragma-dialectical perspective) and see lots of fallacies. Sure, context matters, but we can see fallacies still in the contexts. Say, they break the conventions of the speech events. Or they are obstructive moves in the contexts.<\/p>\n
Q2: Are you really contesting fallacy theory uberhaupt? Just b\/c arg form X is unavoidable in context C, does that really mean that X isn't fallacious? <\/p>\n
Q3: Take Bacon's Doctrine of the Idols. It's a story of the development of superstitions. Aren't these observations useful? We need to cultivate a package of habits that are attentive to these vices.<\/p>\n
Q4: Isn't this a false dilemma? It's either a perfect crystaline form for evaluation or all subjective? Don't most theories of argumentation work on working out a tertium quid?<\/p>\n
Q5: What about equivocation? Isn't that a fallacy, even on the subjectivist account?<\/p>\n
Q6: Isn't reasoning a rule bound excercise? Fallacies are cases where we break the rules.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
IGOR \u00c5\u00bd. \u00c5\u00bdAGAR (Educational Research Institute & Univ. of Maribor, Slovenia) Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them or “Commit” Them? Zagar poses two questions . First, an epistemological one: do we (everyone, politicians, the media…) commit fallacies, or do we (intentionally) use them? Second, a methodological one: when we (philosophers, sociologists, discourse analysts…) detect a fallacy, … Continue reading OSSA Day 3: do we commit or use fallacies?<\/span>