Robert Pinto, University of Windsor<\/p>\n
"Emotions and Reasons"<\/p>\n
Pinto argues: (1) emotions can provide reasons for action because the evaluative attitudes at their core can, together with cognitive attitudes, provide reasons for the conative attitudes (desires and intentions) – which are reasons to act<\/p>\n
(2) evaluative attitudes can be rooted in reasons insofar as they arise from a combination of cognitive attitudes together with other evaluative or conative attitudes which (potentially) render them rational.<\/p>\n
Q1:<\/strong> Can one fear something without believing it is impeding (e.g., is it right to say that some S can live in fear of cancer without having the belief that it is impending?)<\/p>\n Q2: <\/strong>What is it to value wrongly? How does one determine that one has done so?<\/p>\n Q3:<\/strong> What about irrational fears\/emotions? E.g., one certainly can fear spiders without having any beliefs about their badness. One can even fear them despite<\/em> actively believing them to be good thing!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Robert Pinto, University of Windsor "Emotions and Reasons" Pinto argues: (1) emotions can provide reasons for action because the evaluative attitudes at their core can, together with cognitive attitudes, provide reasons for the conative attitudes (desires and intentions) – which are reasons to act (2) evaluative attitudes can be rooted in reasons insofar as they … Continue reading OSSA Day One: Emotion and Reason<\/span>