Paul Krugman has written much of late on Reagan and racism. David Brooks even responded, however cluelessly, to some of Krugman’s arguments. As someone at Salon pointed out, Brooks ended up giving evidence for Krugman’s position–that is, that the Republican party was cognizant of the significance of Reagan’s announcing his support for “states’ rights” at the Neshoba County Fair (site of a 1964 Klan murder). Reagan knew what he was doing, Brooks argued, he just bumbled into it. Besides, Reagan, Brooks and others argue, was not a bigot. And they go on to list all of the evidence of that. He had black friends, etc.
As Krugman correctly points out, however, that’s not the point:
>Reagan’s defenders protest furiously that he wasn’t personally bigoted. So what? We’re talking about his political strategy. His personal beliefs are irrelevant.
Indeed, one has heard stories about Reagan’s personal opposition to some forms of segregation, his friendship with African Americans, and so on. Those observations, one might argue, are red herrings. Would that it were true that these things were sufficient to make one not racist. If that were the case, no one would be racist, nor would but a few be criminals, and almost no one would do anything immoral–or, according to Plato at least, no one:
>Now we may ask (1) how a man who judges rightly can behave incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange-so Socrates thought-if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best-people act so only by reason of ignorance. Now this view plainly contradicts the observed facts, and we must inquire about what happens to such a man; if he acts by reason of ignorance, what is the manner of his ignorance? For that the man who behaves incontinently does not, before he gets into this state, think he ought to act so, is evident. But there are some who concede certain of Socrates’ contentions but not others; that nothing is stronger than knowledge they admit, but not that on one acts contrary to what has seemed to him the better course, and therefore they say that the incontinent man has not knowledge when he is mastered by his pleasures, but opinion. But if it is opinion and not knowledge, if it is not a strong conviction that resists but a weak one, as in men who hesitate, we sympathize with their failure to stand by such convictions against strong appetites; but we do not sympathize with wickedness, nor with any of the other blameworthy states. Is it then practical wisdom whose resistance is mastered? That is the strongest of all states. But this is absurd; the same man will be at once practically wise and incontinent, but no one would say that it is the part of a practically wise man to do willingly the basest acts. Besides, it has been shown before that the man of practical wisdom is one who will act (for he is a man concerned with the individual facts) and who has the other virtues.
Krugman’s latest piece does seem to be an instance of begging the question.
Consider this:
“Thus, Reagan repeatedly told the bogus story of the Cadillac-driving welfare queen — a gross exaggeration of a minor case of welfare fraud. He never mentioned the woman’s race, but he didn’t have to.”
and this:
“Reagan paralleled Nixon’s success in constructing a politics and a strategy of governing that attacked policies targeted toward blacks and other minorities without reference to race — a conservative politics that had the effect of polarizing the electorate along racial lines.”
That Southern Whites responded to Regan’s criticisms of welfare programs doesn’t imply that those ideas were informed primarily by attutides of race. Research has long documented significant differences between Southern and Norther whiltes, just as they have found similar divisions between non-whites. Krugman takes from his data what he wants to. Could there not be significant ideological differences between the two populations? If that were the case, could not Regan’s strategists been aware of those distinctions? Southern whites have long detested welfare programs, long before the the Civil Rights Era. It was a bloc of Southern Democrats that opposed much of Roosevelt’s economic reforms, none of which were attributed by historians to racism.
There are legitimate cross-sectional distinctions with regard to economic ideology betweeen Norther and Southern democrats. Why Krugman is certain that they are founded entirely upon race isn’t clear. Unless, of course, it amounts to nothing more than begging the quwestions, in which case, he has some research to do.
Maybe. But that’s not what “begging the question means.” For that, see the fallacy explanation. I also don’t think Krugman is making the extravagant claim you suggest he is (“entirely” and “solely” don’t appear in his claims, for instance). He claims that Reagan and Republicans have appealed to racial divisions. His evidence is what Republicans have said. He could be wrong on the general claim, of course, but you can point that out as an evidential or factual issue.
It is Krugman’s position, as you’ve stated, that Reagan exploited racial differences. He has interpreted evidence is such a way as to bolster that claim. I would content that the evidence does not lend itself to a unique interpretation. It can just as easily be understood to represent an already documented difference in economic attitudes between the North and South. I went to ‘begging the question’, because it would appear that Krugman has presupposed the truth of his claim in his analysis of the evidence presented. He sees in that data what he wants to see. Reagan strategists could have been simply playing economic differences, not racial ones.
Just because the evidence (some of which, in this case, is this: “we, Republicans, exploited racial tensions”) can be variously interpreted does not mean one begs the question. All evidence can be variously interpreted. Some interpretations are better than others. If you have a worse one, you have made a mistake, but you haven’t by definition begged the question. Krugman has argued that his interpretation is the best–he hasn’t just assumed it is.
“Krugman has argued that his interpretation is the best–he hasn’t just assumed it is”
To do this, he would have to consider alternative interpretations of the evidence, and then argue that his was the most likely explanation. But, where in the article does he consider another explanation for the differences in economic attitudes between the two regions? Where does he refute the possibility of differing economic ideologies? The fact is, the evidence does only presents a disparity, it does not provide any insight as to why it exists. Why should I accept his explanation?
At the very least, it’s a case of confirmation bias.
That wouldn’t be “confirmation bias” either–whatever you mean by that in this case. Besides, “confirmation bias” presumes that you have the correct answer, as it explains why someone is wrong–not that that person is wrong.
None of this discussion, of course, relates to the original post. But one more point on that. Krugman has argued that Reagan played on racial themes throughout his political career. Resentment about civil rights legislation (and court decisions–cf. “judicial activism”), Krugman claims, played decisive role in the changing electoral strategy of the Republican party. This claim, if you know anything about Nixon’s “Southern Strategy”, is fairly uncontroversial. Krugman just wanted to apply it to Saint Reagan, as dimwits like David Brooks have misunderstand Reagan’s role in the Republican party’s racial political strategy.
If Krugman is wrong about this, then perhaps his evidence is too weak. Perhaps you ought to labor to show that rather than call him for fouls he hasn’t committed. After all, not all bad arguments are fallacious, some are just plain weak. Maybe this is one of them. I doubt it, but maybe it is.
I am familiar with Nixon’s political strategy to bait Southern voters, and understand that material to be well-founded. I am not, however, convinced that Reagan pursued similar policies. Nor am I likely to be convinced on the basis of the evidence Krugman’s presented here. I would not defend Brooks’ response either. At the very least, that Reagan exploited racial attitudes to gain electoral support, is a claim that lacks any conclusive evidence (that I am aware of). Instead, of coming to that conclusion, Krugman speaks more decisively as if there were ample evidence.
“Besides, “confirmation bias” presumes that you have the correct answer, as it explains why someone is wrong–not that that person is wrong.”
No, that’s just how its usually presented.
Cofirmation Bias: confirmation bias is a tendency to search for or interpret new information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions and avoid information and interpretations which contradict prior beliefs.
So you don’t think Krugman has proved his point. Look again: your notion of “confirmation bias” aims to provide a psychological explanation for persistence in false or unfounded beliefs–we all have confirmation bias, after all, for true beliefs. The question here is whether Krugman has false beliefs. Once you establish that (please don’t here–not that I’m not interested, it’s just off topic), then you can wonder why Krugman came to that erroneous conclusion. Confirmation bias, it might turn out, could be an explanation. But at this point, claiming Krugman suffers from that smacks of the ad hominem circumstantial: that is, the “you’re just saying that because. . . ” fallacy.
“Look again: your notion of “confirmation bias” aims to provide a psychological explanation for persistence in false or unfounded beliefs–we all have confirmation bias, after all, for true beliefs.”
That is how it is most often presented in cognitive psychology, but that is not how I apply it here.
According to the definition provided, confirmation bias is an explanation for faulty reasoning. In science, it is just as problematic to arrive at a false conclusion that can be contradicted by evidence, as it to arrive at a conclusion that is simply not sufficiently supported by the evidence. Krugman has collected some data which provides evidence for the claim that there exists differences in voting patterns between Northern and Southern whites. That data does not suggest an explanation for its persistence. Let alone differences in racial attitudes. Yet Krugman manages, within a couple hundred words, to come the conclusion that Southern attitudes towards welfare programs spell from racial attitudes. It’s a nice sociological explanation, but its not in the evidence.
That indicates faulty reasoning which ultimately led him to reach a conclusion that he shouldn’t have. Does my conclusion smack of ad-hominem? Perhaps. I’ve just never seen Krugman make these sorts of unsupported claims about those on the other side of the aisle.
Many comments ago, I wrote the following:
>That wouldn’t be “confirmation bias” either–whatever you mean by that in this case. Besides, “confirmation bias” presumes that you have the correct answer, as it explains why someone is wrong–not that that person is wrong.
Now you confirm that “confirmation bias” is an *explanation* for faulty reasoning (after denying this several times). To repeat, “confirmation bias” will not establish *that* someone’s conclusion is erroneously derived, it will only *explain* what psychological factors led to that person’s having ignored evidence to the contrary. It’s not a logical fallacy. It’s an explanatory tool. Learn the difference.
“To repeat, “confirmation bias” will not establish that someone’s conclusion is erroneously derived, it will only explain what psychological factors led to that person’s having ignored evidence to the contrary. It’s not a logical fallacy. It’s an explanatory tool. Learn the difference.”
I’ve never conflated the two. I’ve only suggested that he has come to a conclusion that is simply not supported by evidence. I’ve suggested confirmation bias as an explanation.
You’ve denied that you meant “confirmation bias” to be a psychological explanation of Krugman’s claims:
But that’s exactly how you apply it here, as you *now* seem to admit. The initial question, however, was *whether* Krugman is wrong; not: “he’s wrong, and what would explain his being wrong.”
Lots of things explain wrongness, confirmation bias, what with its implicit claims about Krugman’s psychological states, and so on, is particularly difficult to establish.
And the question of whether he’s wrong in this case would warrant more discussion in another forum than this one (so don’t bother responding). Krugman has written elsewhere, as have scores of political scientists in book-length treatises, about the racial politics of the Republican party. He could not establish the thesis you impute to him in the space he’s got, and that wasn’t his point anyway.