Andrew Aberdein, of the Florida Institute of Technology, argued that if good arguments are virtuous, then bad arguments are vicious. The problem is that arguments are tokens, not dispositions. Side note: we here at the NS stress this fact in our general disclaimer on bias. We diagnose individual argument tokens, not ideologies.
Back to Aberdein. After dispensing with the idea that the ad hominem is always fallacious that the concept of virtue in argument was a self refuting ad hominem, Aberdein built what I thought was a good case for taking fallacies as argumentative vices–these include dogmatism, reliabilist problems, and failures of diligence in investigating evidence. All good so far, I think.
Dan Cohen (see Scott’s post on his awesome keynote) raised a key question. Argumentative vices seem to provide good reason for discounting arguers, but do argument virtues do the same for individual arguments?