Krugman Challenge, Day 1

We have often claimed that Krugman does not make the same sort of logical mistakes as our friends George Will, David Brooks, and Charles Krauthammer do. Might be time to see whether that is in fact true. Today Krugman gives us this explanation (sorry not free access) of the Bush administration’s fascination with violating the Geneva Convention:

>So why is the Bush administration so determined to torture people? To show that it can. The central drive of the Bush administration — more fundamental than any particular policy — has been the effort to eliminate all limits on the president’s power. Torture, I believe, appeals to the president and the vice president precisely because it’s a violation of both law and tradition. By making an illegal and immoral practice a key element of U.S. policy, they’re asserting their right to do whatever they claim is necessary.

This nicely illustrates some of the problems of interpreting and logical analysis. If we were to represent the text as an argument, we might say:

1. The central drive of the administration is eliminating all limits on president’s power.

2. The Geneva Convention is a limit on the president’s power.

3. Therefore, the administration wants to show that it can ignore the Geneva Convention.

It is a valid inference (if 1 and 2 are true, then 3 must be true) represented like that. Yet when we re-read the original passage something seems amiss.

Krugman takes for granted the conclusion as the initial fact and hence we are dealing with an explanation rather than an argument. (The difference between an argument and an explanation can generally be identified by asking the question whether the premises provide reason to believe the conclusion is true, or whether the “premises” answer the question “why the conclusion is true?”)

But then we must ask whether there is reason to believe that this explanation is the “best explanation.” And here we would expect some argument.

But Krugman doesn’t give it to us, instead he admits that this rests on his belief that

>”torture appeals to the president precisely because it’s a violation of both law and tradition.”

He doesn’t give any reason for this. He should. (But not to give an argument for one’s premises is not a a violation of the rules of logic. All arguments begin from premises that are unjustified within the argument. But one should be willing (and able) to provide justification of the premises when requested).

But the problem is that it is not a terribly persuasive explanation. And Krugman surely realizes that it is a controversial. He is, in effect, claiming that President Bush and Vice President Cheney are motivated primarily by a lust to expand the president’s power and that their policies on torture are motivated primarily by this lust.

There are, it seems to me, plenty of other more plausible explanations. For example, nothing more is needed than the claim that they don’t care about constraints, coupled with a claim about their rejection of the evidence that torture does not produce reliable intelligence is adequate to explain their motivations.

Of course, Krugman could reply that he has rejected this explanation by presenting the evidence that torture cannot provide reliable intelligence (as an argument from authority):

>Is torture a necessary evil in a post-9/11 world? No. People with actual knowledge of intelligence work tell us that reality isn’t like TV dramas, in which the good guys have to torture the bad guy to find out where he planted the ticking time bomb.

>What torture produces in practice is misinformation, as its victims, desperate to end the pain, tell interrogators whatever they want to hear. Thus Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi — who ABC News says was subjected to both the cold cell and water boarding — told his questioners that Saddam Hussein’s regime had trained members of Al Qaeda in the use of biochemical weapons. This “confession” became a key part of the Bush administration’s case for invading Iraq — but it was pure invention.

But, for this to be an argument against the proposed explanation (mine above), we would need to believe that the Bush Administration listens to the relevant “authorities.” Recent history suggests that they do not. There seems to be good reason to believe that the Bush administration really really does believe that torturing suspects will make America safer, just as they seem to have believed that invading Iraq would make America safer.
Once again, it is important that this is a failure at the level not of logic (validity) but of truth (soundness). I may not find his argument sound, but I don’t think he commits any fallacies.

22 thoughts on “Krugman Challenge, Day 1”

  1. I winced at this phrase:

    >So why is the Bush administration so determined to torture people.

    It’s perilously close to a complex question:

    1. Is the Bush administration determined to torture people?

    2. If so, why is it *so very* determined?

    1 is enough of a live question–whether they advocate torture–so you can’t embed it with 2.

  2. Yes. Perhaps \”Why is the Bush administration so determined to allow torture?\” might be fairer. But, it might amount to the same thing.

    There\’s also an interesting ambiguity in the choice of object–i.e. \”people.\” This makes it sound entirely indiscriminate. As though they don\’t care who they torture as long as they get to torture someone! It\’s maybe a little cheap rhetoric, but probably not fallacious.

  3. I find it curious how this site’s authors both seem to share a peculiar disposition. Both seem determined to reject any inquiry into the possible unavowed motives of public actors. Whether it’s the unavowed motives of liberals who don’t like large, popular, and successful corporations, or the unavowed motives of the Bush administration in its attempt to legalize torture — no such speculation is ever to be entertained.

    Now, strictly from the standpoint of logic, I can see the analytical use to removing these speculations from our minds. But writing about politics is not and should not be entirely about logic. It’s also about the analysis of character and indeed psychology, and in these things, logic does not always carry the day. To reduce political writing strictly to logical correctness misses much of the point of the exercise, I would say.

  4. Well, what you say seems right, Jason. When one engages in mathematical analysis of motion one does not speak about the reason something is moving. A book on the physics of baseball should not talk about rumors surrounding various players.
    We would never claim to engage in political, or historical, or sociological, or economic analysis of the political media.

    As our masthead makes plain, we are concerned to teach logic through the analysis of political media. I\\\’m not sure what strikes you as \\\\\\\”curious\\\\\\\” here, perhaps, it\’s an effect of encountering a difference disciplinary perspective on phenomena you are familiar with.

    Inquiry into \”unavowed motivations\” surely requires argument and evidence. If that argument and evidence is presented we are interested in examining that argument. But if it is \”speculation\” that does not rest on evidence and argument, then you are right we are not terribly interested in it. We would welcome a blog that focused on \”speculation\” in the absence of evidence and argument on the unavowed motivations of public actors, but will leave it to those trained in examining such speculation to do so.

    In addition, we certainly do not reject inquiry into unavowed motivations, but presume that it should abide by standards of reason and evidence. When someone asserts a motivation without evidence in order to undermine a position or a policy, we should be suspicious. Much of this in the political discourse (and what passes for \”inquiry into unavowed motivations\”) is little more than ad hominem argumentation. I think this last point is important. Some ad hominem argument are obvious (attack ad\\\’s, for example, or George Will\’s recent column). Some of it, however, is subtler. The stunning thing, of course, is that people are swayed by these \”arguments,\” even though an Introduction to Logic course should train you to notice them and be unpersuaded by them.

    We certainly would not claim that we exhaust \”politics\” in our writings. It seems correct to say, as you do, that political analysis of politics should consider more than logic. We, however, are concerned with the logical analysis of politics.
    As we have written many times, satisfying logical criteria of valid argumentation is only a necessary condition for responsible writing and says little about the truth or the insightfulness of what is written.

    Responsible reading and writing is what we are trying to teach in our jobs and enact in our own work. We believe that this is the essential starting place for political discourse, not however the totality of it. We believe that you can acquire the skills through practice that will tend with suitable motivations towards responsible reading and writing. We know that many pundits and public actors, and far more writers in the blogosphere, do not practice responsible reading and writing. Though I wouldn\\\\\\\’t want to speculate as to whether this is caused by an absence of the relevant skills or the absence of a commitment to reasoned discourse. I will readily admit that maintaining high standards of reasoning requires constant vigilance and a certain humility, as my own failures reveal to me readily.

    Thanks for your comment.

  5. Would Krugman’s position/argument have been strengthened if he had, say, cited at least one example of the Bush administration’s quest to arrogate greater power to the executive as has been alleged often, or if Krugman offered an example of how the Bush administration thinks extreme measures/torture make sense against suspected terrorists?

  6. We would never claim to engage in political, or historical, or sociological, or economic analysis of the political media.

    As our masthead makes plain, we are concerned to teach logic through the analysis of political media. I’m not sure what strikes you as ”curious” here, perhaps, it’s an effect of encountering a difference disciplinary perspective on phenomena you are familiar with.

    Well, I think the problem I have with this approach is that it proves very little. Its political usefulness is quite small, whatever its logical rigor may be. In a sense, you aren’t writing about politics at all — but then, you seem to want to position yourselves as political authors or authorities… of some kind or another. It reads as equivocal, whether you intend it that way or not. I think the recent comments at my blog have illustrated what I mean.

  7. Russell, perhaps he could strengthen it that way. At least it might lead to a pattern that would suggest an underlying interest in expanding power. But notice that Krugman is claiming that

    >the central drive of the Bush administration — more fundamental than any particular policy — has been the effort to eliminate all limits on the president’s power.

    Undoubtedly, the power of the president has been expanded in the last 6 years–there are plenty of examples of that. But to claim that it is the \\\”central drive\\\” would require much stronger evidence (and note that he claims it is a drive to eliminate \\\”all limits\\\” on the president\\\’s power, which seems a little excessive).

    Then in addition he would need to have some reason to believe that this policy is being driven primarily by that central drive and not other interests or intentions.

    The burden of proof lies with him and the argumentative requirement to make the case that this is likely the real motivation is quite high. I\\\’m not even sure how one could make that case. The fact that lots of things have expanded presidential power does not entail that expanding presidential power was the motivation for advancing those things.

    Your latter option would actually weaken Krugman\\\’s argument since it would show that the Bush administration thinks it is a good idea to allow torture rather than simply a way of gaining more power for the presidency. But, I think it would provide a more plausible explanation of why the Bush administration wants torture–that is, they think it is beneficial for the U.S.

    Thanks for the comment. You\’re approaching the problem in the right way. Arguments are not static but can and should be improved upon and developed when questioned and criticized.

  8. >Well, I think the problem I have with this approach is that it proves very little. Its political usefulness is quite small, whatever its logical rigor may be. In a sense, you aren’t writing about politics at all — but then, you seem to want to position yourselves as political authors or authorities… of some kind or another. It reads as equivocal, whether you intend it that way or not. I think the recent comments at my blog have illustrated what I mean.

    Yes, our analysis might not be useful to you, assuming that political discourse has little need of logical analysis. An assumption I would reject–and I would think most people who believe that reason has a necessary place in democratic politics. But, yes if you want the Daily Kos or the Drudge Report, we will certainly disappoint.

    I certainly don\\\’t position myself as a political authority. I will position myself willingly as a citizen who has political beliefs and interests, and as a philosopher who teaches ethics and logic (among other things), and as a human being who aims at rationality in life and discourse.

  9. Yes, our analysis might not be useful to you, assuming that political discourse has little need of logical analysis.

    No, it’s not that. It’s just that — in this piece on Krugman and in the one on Will — what you have essentially done is 1) observe an author using induction, 2) declare induction fallacious, and 3) pat yourselves on the back.

    Fundamentally, I’m not impressed. It’s not that I want Daily Kos or Drudge Report — two sites I almost never read, and that I do not enjoy — but your approach strikes me as a form of self-hobbling that poses as a universal answer to all political discourse. But it’s rather a cheap shortcut, if I may say so.

  10. “strikes me as…” It must have hit you a little too hard! I have never found anything on this site that would suggest the authors approach is “a form of self-hobbling that poses as a universal answer to all political discourse.” At most they are promoting the inclusion of a tool (logic) that could help make some forms of political discourse better. How is this a form of self-hobbling? Where is the section about it being a universal answer? Your belief seems to be unjustified based on the evidence.

  11. >No, it’s not that. It’s just that — in this piece on Krugman and in the one on Will — what you have essentially done is 1) observe an author using induction, 2) declare induction fallacious, and 3) pat yourselves on the back.

    Perhaps you are right and that is all we have done. If so, I should try to be more concise, I think!

    If the author HAD used induction, then we would have judged the induction to be strong or weak.

    In fact, as, I hope, a careful reading of the original post should reveal, I pointed out a LACK of any argument for the unlikely claim that the Bush administration’s central goal is the expansion of presidential power at any cost. Perhaps if Krugman had provided a reasonable inference to this really quite striking claim we would have done your #1. But, we certainly would never do #2, as induction is not fallacious. Obviously when it conforms to the rules of logic it is a “strong” form of reasoning which if the premises are true makes the conclusion likely true. As for #3, well. . ..

    Again, if I may repeat, what we are doing is not a “shortcut” to what you take it to be. You seem to want from logic something it does not aspire to provide you and then complain that it aspires to it. So to re-iterate. The logical analysis of political (or scientific or philosophical or everyday pragmatic) argumentation is a tool (thanks Matt) that enables clear thinking about those respective subject matters. It is a first step to clear and careful communication and thought. It is only a first test for discourse. After arguments are judged for validity or strength, then consideration must be given to the truth of the premises. This lies beyond the expertise of logic. (Though occasionally a premise is so obviously unlikely to be true that we might draw on our non-technical beliefs to point this out).

  12. Dear Jason,

    We ask the reader to draw or test or challenge no more inferences about anyone\’s argument than we mention on this site. So, for instance, if *Will\’s* argument the other day for Coca-Cola is a \”crashing non-sequitur\” then his argument the other day is a crashing non-sequitur (if we\’re right). That\’s all we allege. We don\’t claim that therefore any defense of Coca-Cola is guilty of the same charge. Just as we didn\’t allege that any defense of Wal Mart is guilty of caricaturing the opposition by painting them as clueless and condescending bleeding-heart liberals (without offering evidence). Fallacious inductive arguments establish nothing. Strong inductive arguments provide evidence that ought to engender belief. There\’s a big difference between the two. What we ask here is but a very minimal requirement for rational discourse. It\’s a necessary, but not a sufficient condition.

  13. One last try.

    Sorry Jason for this deluge of responses but I feel I’m not making a point that seems clear to me clear to you as well.

    Remember when you were told that you had to “show the work” on a math or physics exam? Perhaps we can think of the difference between logic checking and political analysis as the difference between getting a right answer on the test and having points taken off for mistakes in the “work.”

    All we are doing is “checking the work.” Whether the answer is right or wrong can be found in the back of the book. But for logic it is the “work” of argumentation that is important. No one gets full credit (even if the answer turns out to be right) if they cheat in the “work.”

  14. All we are doing is “checking the work.” Whether the answer is right or wrong can be found in the back of the book.

    I think you are being rather naive, then. No one expects an op-ed column of only a few hundred words to show all of its “work.” And no one — except, it seems, you — would fault them for this failure.

    I think both Will and Krugman made reasonable inferences. Krugman’s in particular could have been shored up a bit better, but it isn’t very hard to think of other instances, and to name them, so I trust that he declined to mention them simply for the sake of brevity. I can live with that. If you cannot, then I suggest you get out of the business of critiquing op-ed columnists.

  15. >I think you are being rather naive, then. No one expects an op-ed column of only a few hundred words to show all of its “work.” And no one — except, it seems, you — would fault them for this failure.

    >I think both Will and Krugman made reasonable inferences. Krugman’s in particular could have been shored up a bit better, but it isn’t very hard to think of other instances, and to name them, so I trust that he declined to mention them simply for the sake of brevity. I can live with that. If you cannot, then I suggest you get out of the business of critiquing op-ed columnists.

    The contortions of your critique are getting hard to keep up with. We now have a new critique which is that op-ed writers need not defend their assertions. And the reader should judge their assertions on the basis of some sort of \\\\\\\”intuition\\\\\\\” as you seem to be using, a sort of feeling that the view is \\\”reasonable.\\\” But of course the notion of being \\\”reasonable\\\” is the notion of being rational ultimately. Since both authors failed to present \\\”inferences\\\” or reasons for holding the controversial claims, it is hard for most of us to judge whether the views are \\\”reasonable\\\” or not without attending to logic.
    I suspect the difficulty is that many don\\\’t care how the political view is established or justified, but only whether it fits with their opinions. This is ideological mirroring. People are attracted to Fox news or the Nation (NYT is not particularly liberal on its op-ed pages) because it reflects their own prejedices and feelings.They ignore whether their prejudices and feelings are well founded, and enjoy the feeling of confirmation when they read their thoughts mirrored in the words of luminaries such as Will and Krugman. It\\\’s also the reason for the tendency of political blogs to be \\\”group confirmation sessions\\\” where no real discussion ever occurs because no one disagrees with the basic ideological assumption of the chosen club. If this is all political discourse amounts to, then more than \\\”getting out of the business of critiquing op-ed columnists\\\” is reasonably concluded–giving up on politics entirely would be plausible (heading back outside the cave, guys, see ya later!).
    There is a notion, perhaps quaint to some, that one should have reasons for one\\\’s beliefs and not engage in \\\”speculation into unavowed motivations\\\” in the absence of evidence, and that the sort of ideological confirmation that substitutes for reasoned political discussion is a danger to democracy and thoughtfulness. This is obviously a sort of moral claim that rests on a conception of moral virtue that places thoughtfulness and reason at the head of the virtues.
    I would point out once again, since you seem determined to ignore the actual content of the analysis that I posted originally, that Krugman\\\\\\\’s claim is not merely lacking evidence or argument, but is in fact implausible on its surface.

    What sort of evidence might Krugman advance for the following central claim?

    >The central drive of the Bush administration — more fundamental than any particular policy — has been the effort to eliminate all limits on the president’s power.

    Well, he might provide a series of cases where the Bush administration has acted to eliminate various limits on presidential power. This would be a long list. It would not, however, show that \\\\\\\”central drive of the Bush administration\\\\\\\” has been to attain this. This is a version of the \\\”intentional fallacy\\\” or a probable post hoc propter hoc fallacy. The fact that these have been the effects of a variety of policies doesn\\\\\\\’t say anything about the intention by itself. Perhaps removing obtacles to presidential power IS MERELY THE MEANS to other goals or goods. Perhaps, they were sometimes unintended consequences of policies.

    So, not only does he fail to provide the evidence, the point is that it is unlikely that an argument can be given (short of Krugman possessing a secret email saying \\\\\\\”Muh-ha-ha-ha-ha! We won the election now lets try to achieve our central goal of eliminating all constraints on presidential power\\\\\\\”). The only other alternative is to show s systematic pattern of behavior where the behavior cannot be explained by anything other than the goal of expanding presidential power. This is probably what you have in mind, but I think my comments about the possibility of creating a convincing argument in this way are a high bar to cross.
    Again, the point is that there are serious reasons that serious people advance against torture and for or against wal-mart. We do not achieve anything when we ignore the serious arguments of serious people and replace them with mis-readings that conveniently ignore the actual argument in order to \\\”score points.\\\” You may be satisfied with Swift-boat politics, some of us are not. And we should continue to sharpen our skills at detecting the cheating of sloppy and cynical thinkers who seek to manipulate the public with their bush league logic tricks. Since, we are committed to teaching students how to free themselves from the tyranny of sloppy and deceptive logic, we will respectfully decline your advice and continue to explore the ways that people cheat in their political reasoning.

  16. The contortions of your critique are getting hard to keep up with. We now have a new critique which is that op-ed writers need not defend their assertions.

    Nonsense. I maintain what I wrote above: You are faulting these writers for using induction, and for relying on facts that they expect their readers already to know. And this, when brought to bear against a writer who is constrained to 750 words, is absurd.

    Your critiques would be far more impressive, and carry far more weight, if you were to turn them against the work found in more thorough venues — The Atlantic, the New Republic, the National Review, Reason. Attacking op-ed columnists for failure to be thorough is like attacking TV commercials. Sure, you can do it… But so what?

    Now, as to your characterization of my own political stances. You write, “You may be satisfied with Swift-boat politics” But really, I must say I think that this is just a lot of your own confirmation bias speaking. The piece I wrote about Wal-Mart contained much real evidence, and it was indeed nuanced, acknowledging both what I felt were the corporation’s good and bad points.

    On what evidence, then, do you infer such things about my political beliefs?

    Oh wait, never mind. No amount of evidence is ever sufficient, for you. Unless, of course, you’re the one making the inference.

  17. I might also add that you are committing a classic logical fallacy yourselves, that of the excluded middle.

    To you, apparently, it’s either your way, in which I suspect that no op-ed columnist could ever satisfy both you and the space constraints of a modern newspaper — or else it’s “Swift Boat politics.” But this makes all op-ed writing, and all speculation about the motives of political actors, into “Swift Boat politics.”

    I submit, however, that op-eds do indeed have their place in reasonable political debate, and that the ones you have criticized in recent days are by no means the equivalent of Swift Boat politics. They are short, they infer things, and that’s exactly their job. But they are not in any way dishonest or worthy of our contempt. Any educated reader will understand, I think, that these writers are pushing an opinion. And after that, it’s up to them to do their homework on the questions raised.

  18. Well, I think at this point all I can add would be to repeat what I have said throughout the last five or six comments. So I will recognize that our disagreement amounts to:

    a) whether columnists need to justify their assertions explicity or whether they can rely on a reader to intuit their actual unasserted justification.

    b) whether in either of the two posts we have been discussing any criticism that refers to induction as a fallacious argument has been made.

    This, it seems to me, is our impasse and having tried my best to explain and argue for my position on each of these two issues, I can only leave it to the reader to judge for themselves.

    Thanks for your input, it has helped me sharpen my views.

    Best wishes,

    Colin

  19. whether in either of the two posts we have been discussing any criticism that refers to induction as a fallacious argument has been made.

    I admit I ought not to have used the word “fallacious.” “Fallible” is the proper term. I regret the error.

    Now do we have anything to discuss? It still seems to me like going after any real-world political text for using induction really doesn’t accomplish very much intellectually.

  20. >Now do we have anything to discuss? It still seems to me like going after any real-world political text for using induction really doesn’t accomplish very much intellectually.

    I might agree with you! But WE ARE NOT CRITICIZING THE TEXTS FOR USING INDUCTION. There is no induction in these texts that\’s the problem.

    Your best response has been that the authors need not supply the evidence, but should rely on the reader to supply the induction. If that is true (a above), then your criticism is reasonable–though (b) is I think textually false.

    I disagree, however, that the author need not justify their assertions. I have explained my reasons at length. The strongest response you have advanced to my mind, is the claim that an 800 word op-ed piece must be enthymemetic somewhere. I agree, but I think when advancing controversial assertions like Krugman did, the author has a responsiblity to justify such maligning of the \”unavowed motivations\” of the various political actors. In the absence of it, I find it to be of a kind–though not the same–with the sort of character assassination of \”swift-boat politics.\”

    So we disagree about the obligations of a columnists, and that is fine.

  21. Jason–

    1. the “fallacy of the excluded middle” you refer to is the false dichotomy (explained elsewhere on this site). They are completely different things. And I’m fairly certain we’re not guilty of that. For first of all we don’t make the claim that it’s either “our way” or “swift boat politics.”

    2. No one is being criticized for the simple employment of induction–as you have continually suggested. Here’s why:

    In logic arguments are typically viewed in two ways, depending on how the conclusion is purported to follow the premises. Those whose conclusions follow (or should follow) with necessity are deductive arguments (and they come in various types–categorical syllogisms and the like); those whose conclusions follow in virtue of probability are inductive arguments (which come in various types–analogies, generalizations, arguments from authority, predictions, etc.). There are two ways of evaluating any argument–in virtue of its factual assertions and in virtue of its inferential claims.

    The first step in evaluating any argument is to assess whether given the truth of its premises the conclusion would follow. In a sense, you suspend disbelief of the premises just in order to check the logic. If an argument passes that test, then it’s considered strong (in the case of inductive arguments, which is what we are talking about here). If it’s strong, then you can assess the truth of its premises. If they are in fact true, then you have what is called a “cogent” argument.

    Fallacious arguments–arguments that commit fallacies as we have described them elsewhere on this site–fail the logic test. Regardless of the truth of the premises, they fail to provide probable support for their conlcusions. Here’s another example of an ad hominem circumstantial argument:

    1. Al Gore has suggested we cut greenhouse gases as they lead to global warming.

    2. But Al Gore is a snob who likes telling people what to do.

    3. Therefore, Al Gore is wrong.

    1 and 2 can both be right. But they don’t lend any probable support to 3. This is not because this is an inductive argument. It’s not because of the limitations of space in an op-ed column. It’s because 1 and 2 are irrelevant to establishing whether Gore is right or not. Gore’s being right or wrong has nothing to do with his being a snob. What results therefore is a weak inductive argument.

    Here’s a strong one:

    1. Al Gore has suggested we cut greenhouse gases as they lead to global warming.

    2. The mass of evidence of leading climatologists proves otherwise.

    3. Al Gore is wrong.

    That’s a strong argument. But the premises are likely to be false. So it’s not cogent. As you can see, we don’t go after op-eds for using induction. Most arguments in op-eds, as you can probably tell, are inductive. Going after them for that fact would be like complaining that they used ink.

    Some of these arguments, as we argue are, are weak. They are too weak, we think, to be offered by such smart people and to be read by the rest of us without wincing. And they are weak in a special sense–they are fallacious. They fit patterns of deceptive or sophistical reasoning first identified by Aristotle in his “De Sophistici Elenchi.”

    So please put to bed the completely erroneous allegation that we accuse people of using induction.

  22. “Now, as to your characterization of my own political stances. You write, “You may be satisfied with Swift-boat politics” But really, I must say I think that this is just a lot of your own confirmation bias speaking. The piece I wrote about Wal-Mart contained much real evidence, and it was indeed nuanced, acknowledging both what I felt were the corporation’s good and bad points.”

    I can’t believe you actually wrote this! Have you ever heard of a suppostion? “You may..” infers that “you may not…” Canderson was not supposing anything about your actual beliefs. I think you’ve mistaken this site for a typical political blog (where things like good reasons are not important). While canderson is being incredibly nice, I see no need to do the same. You obviuosly do not have a fundamental grasp of what logic is or even what it does. You are having trouble identifying main points and making false assumptions. I do agree with canderson though, in that an impasse seems to have been arrived at. When a person in a conversation refuses to (or simply cannot) engage in a rational discussion (which involves more than being polite) then there is nothing the person trying to be rational can do. At that point the converstation is little more than a waste of everyones time. Any argument that anyone can make is open to the same type of logical analysis. Just because an argument appears in an Op/Ed piece does not excuse its author from making mistakes in the logical structure. If a full argument cannot be achieved in the limited space it should not be attempted or it should be broken into sections. Just to clarify, since this seems to a problem, lack of evidence in providing support for the premises is usually not a problem. What usually is the problem is the very way in which the premises are offered in support of the conclusion.

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