More tu quoque in the news. This time, again, perhaps for the nth time, Michelle Obama, advocate of healthy eating. This from Talking Points Memo:
Dr. Keith Ablow, a member of something called the Fox News Medical A-Team, doesn’t think First Lady Michelle Obama has any business promoting childhood nutrition.
“And how well can she be eating? She needs to drop a few,” Ablow said during Tuesday’s episode of “Outnumbered.”
The comment drew a collective cringe from the same four female panelists who had called the first lady “annoying” for her health initiatives only seconds earlier.
Despite the ridicule from his fellow panelists, the show’s “one lucky guy” dug in.
“Well, no, let’s be honest. There’s no french fries happening? That’s all kale and carrots? I don’t buy it,” Ablow said, adding that he would welcome nutrition advice from President Obama.
This guy makes my job too easy. By the way, this is my job.
In tu quoque news today:
“Obama has decimated the friggin’ constitution, so I don’t give a damn,” the Helmetta cop says on camera. “Because if he doesn’t follow the Constitution we don’t have to.”
Reminds me of this:
via Gin and Tacos, Reddit, etc.
We’ve been busy sorting our stuff out after a huge move–and it’s all still in boxes. In the meantime, as we get back up to speed here, please consider this piece in Slate about the general terribleness of arguments against marriage equality, etc.
The answer, it turns out, is that there are none—none, at least, that aren’t driven by animus. A review of the failed attempts here is instructive. At various points, conservatives argued that every child deserves a mom and a dad; that gay people simply make inferior parents; that marriage isn’t marriage without penile-vaginal penetration; that legalizing gay marriage would lower birth rates; and, best of all, that somehow, allowing gay people to get married would cause more straightpeople to have children out of wedlock.
We’ve talked about this topic quite a lot here. In fact, of all topics, it seems to have produced the most commentary.
Perhaps it’s time, as the author suggests (and I think as Colin had argued here a long time ago), to consider this argument over.
Nice little piece by Brendan Nyhan at the New York Times’ “The Upshot” about how ideology and factual beliefs collide. Here’s a taste:
Mr. Kahan’s study suggests that more people know what scientists think about high-profile scientific controversies than polls suggest; they just aren’t willing to endorse the consensus when it contradicts their political or religious views. This finding helps us understand why my colleagues and I have found that factual and scientific evidence is often ineffective at reducing misperceptions and can even backfire on issues like weapons of mass destruction,health care reform and vaccines. With science as with politics, identity often trumps the facts.
So what should we do? One implication of Mr. Kahan’s study and other research in this field is that we need to try to break the association between identity and factual beliefs on high-profile issues – for instance, by making clear that you can believe in human-induced climate change and still be a conservative Republican like former Representative Bob Inglis or an evangelical Christian like the climate scientist Katharine Hayhoe.
The deeper problem is that citizens participate in public life precisely because they believe the issues at stake relate to their values and ideals, especially when political parties and other identity-based groups get involved – an outcome that is inevitable on high-profile issues. Those groups can help to mobilize the public and represent their interests, but they also help to produce the factual divisions that are one of the most toxic byproducts of our polarized era. Unfortunately, knowing what scientists think is ultimately no substitute for actually believing it.
All of this seems right to me. The last point is especially interesting. It reminds me (somewhat tangentially) of a paper (by Marcin Lewinksi and Mark Aakhus) on polylogical reasoning I saw at ISSA last week. Though perhaps not the point of the research (I’m only vaguely familiar with it), the problem is that we have fora for dialogues (or di-logues), but none for the poly-logues that more satisfactorily represent the actual dialectical terrain. This forces ideological alliances such as the GOP one, where you’re pretty much forced to take positions on factual issues in order to belong to the club. I imagine the Democratic position then forms in contrast (or t’other way round). If you want to be in the game, you have to be on a team. Well, it’s a stupid game.
The war metaphor for argument is a dominant one. Here are some pertinent reflections by Dan Cohen, from Colby College in Maine.
Good stuff. And it was nice to see Dan at ISSA.
It’s time for another argumentation conference. This time in Amsterdam . I’m looking forward to the paper on whether there are arguments.
Perhaps there’s an academic paper in what we might call the “Doctor Analogy of Epistemic Competence.” The basic thought is to treat any epistemic claim as if it were a claim made by your medical doctor. You undeniably have a personal interest in the accuracy and competence of such claims, so a history of failure or incompetence in this regard is relevant to you. Here’s an example:
“The analogy I’d draw is the following: You go to a doctor, who diagnoses an ailment and prescribes drugs and surgery,” Landay said. “The diagnosis, however, turns out to be disastrously wrong and as a result, the drugs and surgery leave you crippled for years to come. Are you going to go back to that same doctor to diagnose your next illness? No, you aren’t. In fact, you probably sued him/her for malpractice after the first go-round. Unfortunately, we can’t sue Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Feith and the others for malpractice. But we can stop listening to them.”
Naturally, the virtue of Dr.Analogy is that it’s measurable: certain kinds of outcomes can be assessed very directly. Yet, somehow, the Doctors who predicted or diagnosed the Iraq situation correctly are virtually invisible, while the ones who got it wrong are everywhere.
In the Guardian, philosopher Jonathan Wolff argues that the Higher Education industry is creating the ideal conditions for the return of sophistry.
We may well have recreated the conditions that led to the rise of Sophistry. In just the last few years we have introduced significant fees for education; rapid opinion sharing in the form of the National Student Survey (NSS), repeated every year and widely publicised; and increasingly desperate competition between universities.
My anecdotal sense is that this has long been the case here in the US–where we have to battle not even with the instrumental value of logic, philosophy, etc., but with its perceived instrumental value.
Via the Leiter Reports.
I have some sympathy with the view that philosophy is a waste of time, though I hope it isn’t. I really fear, however, that normative informal logic might be –though I cannot the basic self-referential problem that judging it to be a waste of time requires using it, therefore, etc.
There is a discussion on the Leiter Reports about the worthlessness of philosophy, as argued in Peter Unger’s recent book (and discussed in this interview at 3QuarksDaily). Some, in the comments on LR, allege Unger’s thesis is self-refuting (along the lines mentioned above). Someone responded–anonymously–as follows:
So far, it seems most people are either attacking Unger personally for having a cushy philosophy job while saying philosophy sucks or are resorting to cheap tricks like: If philosophy is empty and his argument is a philosophical one, then that’s empty too, so there.
This accurately describes some of the comments, but the anonymous author here ought to know that such arguments are not ipso facto fallacious or irrelevant (I’m guessing this is what the author means by “cheap tricks”) because they’re ad hominem. We’ve discussed this here. Unger’s failure to apply his thesis too himself may be a sign that he doesn’t find his view credible. More importantly, the self-referential failure of Unger’s view (if this is accurate), is not really a cheap trick, but rather the entire stupid problem. Philosophy, in particular epistemology and its various applied fields, studies the question as to what makes for justified belief that something is worthless. A worthwhile endeavor.
A student of mine is a lapsed vegetarian–with vegetarian parents. They object, for religious and ethical reasons, to his meat eating. He retorts with the following argument:
If it’s wrong to eat animals because they’re living creatures, it’s wrong to eat plants, because they’re also living creatures.
My student acknowledges that this is a weak argument but nonetheless reports that this is a successful rejoinder to the extent that his parents do not reply. Let’s say for the sake of argument that this is the case. Let’s further say, again for the sake of argument, that the parents’ argument is both weak in itself and weakly held by them.
This means that his parents do not have (or do not share) very good reasons for their vegetarianism. So, the student replies to a weak argument with an equally weak argument. When I raised this point, he shrugged his shoulders and said: “what does it matter? It does the job.”
Students of argumentation, in my limited experience, tend to study either bad arguments or bad replies, but not both together. And in this case, the bad reply is offered on purpose, because a better reply isn’t necessary.
I’m inclined to think this is wrong, and that the student owes the parents (and himself) a better reply to a better argument. I say this because he’s aware of how bad his own argument is. On the other hand, his parents haven’t offered a very good defense, and answering a better argument would be iron manning them.